Notes ONE: Considering the Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use 1. Useful data on the likely physical impact of nuclear explosions can be found in Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense and Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977). 2. On the perceived likelihood of war after the Cold War, see Donald J. Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Charles Doran, and Michael Mandelbaum, “Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 139–152; William Arkin, Damien Durrant, and Hans Kristenson , “Nuclear Weapons Headed for the Trash,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47, no. 10 (December 1991): 14–19; John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balance,” International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 86–124; and Robert Jervis, “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” International Security 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991–1992): 39–73. Considerably more pessimistic views are presented in Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000). 3. The possibly benevolent impact of economic interdependence in reinforcing peace is discussed in Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1990): 86–124. 4. For examples of analyses suggesting a greatly reduced significance for all military capabilities, see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Modern War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey Sapolsky, “Come Home, America,” International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 5–48. 5. On the potential endurance of the model of collective security demonstrated in response to Iraqi aggression in 1991, see Richard K. Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War?: Collective Security, Arms Control and the New Europe,” International Security 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992): 5–43; and John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–1995): 5–49. 6. For some reflective analyses of the real challenges in the post–Cold War world see Fred C. Ikle, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January 1996): 119–128; and Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 52–67. 7. On Indian and Pakistani thinking about real uses of nuclear weapons, see Ashok Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option (New York: Praeger, 1976); and Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development (New York: Croom Helm, 1987). 8. The significance and impact of the September 11th attacks are outlined in “Reinventing War,” Foreign Policy, no. 127 (November–December 2001): 30–47; and Bruno Tertrais, ed., Nuclear Issues in the Post–September 11 Era (in English) (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, 2003). 9. The possible nuclear role in deterring Iraq from resorting to chemical or biological attacks is noted in Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), p. 86. 10. The complications for the other members of the “axis of evil” are addressed in Joseph Cirincione, “Can Preventive War Cure Proliferation?” Foreign Policy, no. 137 (July–August 2003): 66–69. 11. This kind of optimism about the impact of nuclear proliferation in general is outlined very well by Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: IISS, 1981). 12. A useful overview of North Korean behavior can be found in Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: Macmillan, 1995). 13. Japanese considerations in future nuclear choices are discussed in Shawn Burnie and Aileen Mioko Smith, “Japan’s Nuclear Twilight Zone,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57, no. 3 (May–June 2001): 58–62. 14. The risks that Israeli nuclear weapons will be used are discussed in Yair Evron, Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma (New York: Routledge, 1994). 15. For a reference to such Iranian statements, see George Perkovich, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Challenge (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 16. On the history of the American declaratory policy here, see Ivo Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 17. On crisis diplomacy and the Taiwan dispute, see Robert S. Ross, “The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility and the Use of Force,” International Security 25 no. 2 (Fall 2000): 87–123. 18. The historical evolution of Chinese statements about the use of nuclear weapons is outlined in...