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C H A P T E R F I V E Appropriate United States Policy Responses Having outlined a wide range of ways that nuclear weapons could again come into use, a variety of global popular and governmental reactions, and likely American popular reactions, we now suggest appropriate United States policy responses to the scenarios we have described. The discussion will begin with some general observations about what we would hope to see here. The damage of such a nuclear escalation will be less, and the possible gains greater, if there has been advance planning for the various ways in which such an event could occur, rather than having the United States government caught by surprise and then react on an ad hoc basis. To repeat a caveat noted at the outset, anticipating such an occurrence does not have to mean that we are pessimistically resigned to expecting future nuclear weapons use or are in any way welcoming it. Rather, preparation indicates that some prior thought has been given to the policy choices and likely consequences. All “war plans” and other advance planning for policy contingencies have definite limitations. They remain based in speculation; if one convinces oneself that one has seen the future in such a planning exercise, one risks being caught even more by surprise if an actual event deviates from the anticipated scenario. Yet a decision to avoid any advance consideration of the likely forms of nuclear weapons use, for fear of being accused of excessive pessimism or for fear of creating a self-confirming hypothesis, would sacrifice opportunities to minimize the losses after a nuclear attack, and opportunities for such an event to make American policy more effective in the future. Even disasters may contain opportunities, which are put to best use if they are recognized early. And it may be that not every use of nuclear weapons will amount to a disaster, for the world or for the United States. United States Preeminence It is likely that the United States will remain the preeminent power in the world, in economic strength and conventional military capabilities as well as in the size and qualities of its nuclear arsenal, into the foreseeable future.1 This has some enormous benefits for the United States and the world, since most of the world has had reason to see America as a very benevolent leader, a force whose presence tends to maintain peace rather than disturb it, a force for prosperity around the world.2 Yet there are individuals and governments that resent this American preeminence and insist on portraying the United States as a nonbenevolent “hegemon,” rather than as a helpful leader. There are also, indeed, many Americans who do not relish the role of being a hegemon or “world policeman” in the post–Cold War world. The risk of America’s being the target of the first new use of nuclear weapons, or in the next use after that, are increased by its visibility and preeminence, because what would drive the targeting of nuclear escalation is likely to be not the world’s interest but the deep resentments of some national or terrorist leader. One major generic question affecting reactions to nuclear escalation thus is whether the United States will seek to maintain its preeminent status, in the military and other fields, or to reduce it, letting other powers become more central to the maintenance of world law and order and prosperity. And the other generic question of course is whether the world is willing to be led by the United States. In considering the world’s acceptance of an American leadership role, one could compare the international response to Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, which very much illustrated the American role of a “sheriff” recruiting a “posse,” with the much lower support and enthusiasm displayed in the response to Saddam Hussein’s 2003 failure to comply with all the conditions of the earlier truce (most especially the acceptance of reliable safeguards that he was not producing weapons of mass destruction).3 Perhaps the difference in response is explained by the difference in stimulus; the earlier aggression was so blatant, while the latter failure to cooperate with inspectors was more debatable . Or perhaps the outside world had simply become more fatigued and less resolute as the years had passed, while the Clinton administration succeeded that of the senior President Bush, only to be succeeded itself by the younger President Bush. Appropriate United...

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