Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death

7. Persons as Qualities or Phases of Human Organisms

Persons as Qualities or Phases of Human Organisms chapter seven The constitutive interpretation of the relation between the person and the human being explains how there can be a divergence in the life histories of persons and human beings and how, at the same time, a person can be a substance without generating a case of relative identity. It may be claimed, however, that we should abandon the notion that persons are substances in favor of treating them as phases or functional specifications of some other substance (e.g., human beings). As noted in earlier chapters, the biological paradigm of death assumes this view of persons. Examples of phased predicates, or “phased sortals,” include infant, adult, tadpole , caterpillar, pupa, banker, mayor, and sapling. These predicates apply during certain points in the life history of whatever substance they restrict. Substance concepts , or “substance sortals,” such as human being, horse, and tree, are distinguished from phased predicates in that they (1) answer in a fundamental sense what something is and (2) apply throughout an individual’s life history. Thus, boy and mayor are phased predicates, because the individual referred to by, say, the boy John Doe or the mayor John Doe may continue to exist even though that individual is no longer a boy or no longer a mayor. Substance concepts, in contrast, entail the individual ceasing to exist if it no longer satisfies the concept. Thus, if person is a genuine substance concept for John Doe, then if John Doe ceases to be a person, John Doe ceases to exist.1 Since the biological paradigm of death treats person as a phased sortal concept, Bernat, Culver, and Gert (1982a, 1982b; Bernat 1998; Culver and Gert 1982) hold that, even though the person, for example, Nancy Cruzan, may no longer exist when she has irreversibly lost consciousness, this does not mean that Nancy Cruzan necessarily ceases to exist. The organism has simply lost some set of nonessential qualities that we group together as the referent of person. Just as banker denotes a set of qualities or functions that bankers typically engage in and that define the profession, so, too, person denotes a set of qualities or functions that human beings (and perhaps members of other species, such as apes, dolphins, or creatures on some distant planet) typically engage in and that define personhood. The biological paradigm treats human being or human organism as the substance concept of which personhood is a phase. Thus, only when Nancy Cruzan ceases to be a human organism does Nancy Cruzan cease to exist. In this view, person is treated like other phased sortals, such as banker or boy. Even though a banker leaves her job or a boy grows up to be a man, this does not entail these individuals ceasing to exist. The banker and boy may no longer exist, but the human being that was the banker or boy does. As Bernat, Culver, and Gert maintain, phases are not the kind of thing that literally dies. The phased sortal interpretation of person would enable us to interpret the cases of total amnesia and permanent vegetative state (PermVS) as cases in which a person ceases to exist (i.e., the person phase ends) without the individual (i.e., the organism) ceasing to exist. Also, in the case of total amnesia, it could be maintained under the phased sortal interpretation that a new person starts to exist. Thus, with respect to Locke’s memory criterion of personal identity, the phased sortal interpretation enables us to countenance the possibility of two or more persons sharing one body. Since the person is identified with a set of abilities and qualities—that is, a certain functional specification—and since the sets of abilities and qualities are so different before and after the amnesia, the phased sortal interpretation would likely treat the radically disconnected sets of memories and mental qualities as different persons. Note that the constitutive interpretation, in contrast , can appeal to the essential matter underlying the psychological functions in support of treating the total amnesiac as the same person. The matter underlying the phase, however, is irrelevant in a view that treats the person simply as a set of qualities or functions. This reasoning underlies Locke’s treatment of the hypothetical case of body swapping: “For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler as soon as...