Democracy Delayed: The Case of Castro's Cuba

3. Political Efficacy and Independent Communication

C H A P T E R 3 Political Efficacy and Independent Communication Political Efficacy and Transitions The concept of political efficacy was introduced to political science by Angus Campbell in 1954.1 It has been defined as “the feeling that individual political action does have or can have an impact upon the political process.”2 There is strong empirical evidence supporting the association between a feeling of efficacy and political participation.3 Much of the evidence comes from studies conducted in democracies, linking a sense of efficacy and voting. Yet the concept of efficacy is also relevant in explaining political participation in contexts where individuals engaging in such activities might suffer harsh repression . Numerous theoretical and empirical works support this assertion. I argue that a widespread sense of political efficacy among the population is necessary for mass protests to occur under dictatorships, especially in hardline ones like the communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Cuba. The importance of a sense of personal political efficacy among the population for them to participate in political activities that challenge the political power structure has been recognized in various studies of unconventional political behavior, that is, behavior that can lead to punishment by the authorities . Alan Marsh found that a belief in the effectiveness of protest behavior (e.g., demonstrations and invasions of property) in Britain had a strong positive impact on the likelihood that people would engage in such behavior.4 Mitchell Seligson obtained evidence in his study of land invasions by peasants in Costa Rica supporting previous findings that a high sense of personal efficacy is necessary to participate in such activities; discontent is insufficient.5 Consistent with these previous studies, a survey conducted by Opp, Voss, and Gern in Leipzig after the fall of communism shows that a sense of political efficacy in the population was the key to participation in the demonstrations that took place there before the collapse of the communist regime. Opp, Voss, and Gern conducted a large number of interviews among residents of Leipzig soon after the fall of communism. They found that the vast majority of those who participated in demonstrations up to October 9, 1989 (when the repressive apparatus ceased to function), believed that it was very likely that they would suffer severe sanctions (e.g., being arrested or injured by the security forces) for participating in public protests. With each passing demonstration before October 9, the percentage of those who feared repression increased, with fear being most prevalent on October 9.6 Before October 9, there were rumors that the government was going to implement a “Chinese solution” and troops were deployed. But fear of repression did not stop people from marching. On October 9, 70,000 people gathered at or near the Nikolai Church in Leipzig for a protest march.7 The interview data collected by Opp, Voss, and Gern also show that feelings of personal political efficacy among a significant percentage of the population was an indispensable factor for massive protests. People believed, even before the turning point on October 9, that extensive protests could produce political changes and that personal participation would be influential in achieving that goal.8 These findings not only support my argument about the importance of a widespread belief in personal political efficacy for mass demonstrations but also undermine the idea that fear of repression in Cuba explains the very low level of citizen participation in opposition activities. Their findings suggest that people can surmount their fear of repression if they think their actions can bring about political change. The validity of the survey done by Opp, Voss, and Gern is indirectly supported . There is consistency between its findings about the importance of political efficacy in explaining participation in mass protests and theoretical ar56 Democracy Delayed guments on the relationship between these two variables in the Eastern European transitions. In turn, these theoretical formulations embody empirical observations . Przeworski, in talking about the strategic behavior of actors involved in processes of transitions from authoritarian rule, emphasizes that expectation of success in changing the regime is a pivotal determinant of such behavior. Actors behave rationally, and in transition their expectation of what strategies will be successful are based on signals such as economic crises or manifest loss of regime legitimacy indicated by mass unrest.9 Anthony Oberschall uses a rational choice model of collective protests to explain individual decisions to participate in the 1989...