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100 On May 13–14, 2005, state security forces suppressed an uprising in Andijan city, resulting in the deaths of hundreds—possibly seven hundred—civilians (including many women and children).1 The crackdown after the uprising spread well beyond Andijan Province, resulting in a wave of arrests, a refugee crisis in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, and a turn away from Western engagement in Uzbekistan’s foreign relations.2 For Uzbekistan’s domestic and international politics alike, the 2005 Andijan uprising was a pivotal event, dramatically demonstrating the farreaching consequences of the regime’s tenuous hold over regional politics. The 2005 Andijan uprising was also crucial test for the government, which suddenly faced prospects of widespread demonstrations against the state. In a matter of days, peaceful protests were eclipsed by armed assaults on government buildings in Andijan, a spontaneous mass demonstration in the city square, and violent state repression. How did it happen? What underlying developments led to such catastrophic events? And how did one of Central Asia’s largest, most cohesive state security apparatuses witness the outbreak of protests overwhelming regional authorities, leading to such a dramatic application of force? The uprising began with months-long protests against the arrests and trial of twenty-three prominent local businessmen who were accused of being part of an extremist religious group, Akromiya, and plotting to overthrow the state. After four months of peaceful and well-organized protests outside the courthouse in Andijan, several demonstrators were arrested on the eve of the verdict and friends and relatives of those arrested (perhaps sensing an impending guilty verdict) overran several police stations and a military garrison on May 12, 2005. 5 COERCION AND RENT-SEEKING IN UZBEKISTAN RECTO RUNNING HEAD 101 COERCION AND RENT-SEEKING IN UZBEKISTAN 101 Having armed themselves, the group then attacked the National Security Service headquarters in Andijan (Uzbekistan’s successor agency of the KGB) but was repulsed . It then stormed the prison holding the twenty-three defendants, freeing them and approximately five hundred other prisoners. On the morning of May 13, the armed group took control of the provincial seat of government (hokimiyat ), and over the day several thousand people gathered on the main square in front of the building. Mostly comprised of city residents, these demonstrators made speeches calling for the acquittal of the arrested businessmen, for social and economic problems in Andijan to be resolved, and for President Karimov to come to the province to address their concerns directly. The government responded with overwhelming military force against the demonstrators. Explanations of the Andijan events vary widely and point to a range of factors —backlash effects against a predatory state, opposing business interests, or conflicting clan structures. Some have described the uprising as a revolt of those in the bazaar economy against newly imposed taxes and tariffs on consumer imports and against restrictions on the thriving Central Asian shuttle trade economy generally.3 In May 2002, excessively high tariffs on consumer imports reached 90 percent; in December 2002, smaller enterprises engaging in wholesale import trade were outlawed; in 2003, stalls at major bazaars were auctioned at prohibitively high rates for small shuttle traders; and in November 2004, a law was passed requiring traders to use cash registers and put their earnings in bank accounts.4 But why did the revolt happen in Andijan? All provinces enforced the same restrictive laws during these years. The laws made all traders more vulnerable to predatory tax officials, police, and prokurators. And these laws generated popular protests among local traders and prominent businessmen in the bazaars in every region of Uzbekistan. Others point to clan or regional identity. As noted earlier in the book, some have argued that,in contrast to postcommunist economies undergoing reform— where “winners” have used captured economic assets to weaken administrative controls5 —the lack of economic liberalization in Central Asia has led elites to divest the state of its resources through informal social structures, such as clan or regional groupings.6 These explanations, however, require fine-tuning since “winning” can involve multiple logics of action that are shaped by a wide variety of factors. Moreover, a clan politics analysis to the crisis does not account for how similar structures in the neighboring provinces of Ferghana and Namangan failed to produce an uprising there. A third set of explanations identifies local power struggles within Andijan’s provincial administration.7 Certainly, contestation for political position and economic resources in Andijan were central in the developments that preceded the uprising. But analyses of underlying...

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