From Plato to Platonism

Chapter 9: Platonism as a System

Chapter 9 Platonism as a System Proclus, in his Platonic Theology, avers that Plotinus is the greatest exegete (ε ’ξηγητής) “of the Platonic revelation” (τη̃ς Πλατωνικη̃ς ε ’ποπτεíας).1 The coupling of the term ‘exegete’ with the term ‘revelation’ indicates that Proclus is talking about more than a commentary on the dialogues or an explication de texte. As Plotinus himself says in the course of his presentation of the three fundamental ‘hypostases’ of Platonism: These statements of ours are not recent or new, but rather were made a long time ago, though not explicitly. The things we are saying now are exegeses of those, relying on the writings of Plato himself as evidence that these are ancient views.2 Plotinus, like Numenius, has no doubt that the principles of the Platonic system have been grasped by others long before Plato. But Plotinus, like Proclus, is certain that Plato has revealed these in an incomparable way. This passage tells us three things: Plotinus does not consider himself an innovator 1. Proclus, PT 1.1.16ff. Saffrey-Westerink. In second rank of exegetes are Plotinus’s disciples Porphyry and Amelius; in the third rank are Iamblichus, Theodore of Asine, and unnamed others. In modern times, at the polar opposite to Proclus’s evaluation of the accuracy of Plotinus’s exegetical prowess, is the far more frequently made assessment of Shorey 1938, 36, who held that generally “Neo-Platonic ideas are persistently and mistakenly attributed to Plato himself.” This is done according to a “pseudodialectical exegesis” (39). 2. Plotinus, Enn. V 1, 8.10–14: Και` ει ’ ˜ναι τοὺς λόγους τούσδε μὴ καινοὺς μηδὲ νυ̃ν, α ’λλὰ πάλαι μὲν ει ’ρη̃σθαι μὴ α ’ναπεπταμὲνως, τοὺς δὲ νυ̃ν λόγους ε ’ξηγητὰς ε ’κείνων γεγονέναι μαρτυρίοις πιστωσαμένους τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς ει ’ ˜ναι τοι̃ς αυ ’ του̃ του̃ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν. 228 Chapter 9 or an original philosopher; the exegete is tasked with making explicit what is only implicit; and Plato, too, is not original, at least in his expression of fundamental metaphysical principles. Among the ancients that Plotinus goes on to claim dimly saw the truth are Parmenides, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles. Of Aristotle’s unequivocal commitment to this “chorus,” Plotinus is in some doubt. Those especially who regard Plotinus as an innovator, perhaps malgré lui-même, will hardly be persuaded by the inclusion of Pre-Socratics among those who were ‘Platonists’ before Plato. In this regard, one may perhaps contrast Aristotle’s survey of his predecessors ’ treatment of causality and his conclusion that, although all of these have touched on the four causes in some sense, none of them have done so in an adequate manner.3 Neither Aristotle nor Plotinus seems to have any difficulty in attributing to their predecessors views that are only ‘implicit’ in the texts. The reason for this is clear: both assumed that their predecessors, like themselves , were focused on the truth, which serves as the criterion for exegesis. If, for example, the four causes are the logically necessary and sufficient framework for scientific explanation, then anything that the Pre-Socratics say that shows that they were, however dimly or partially, aware of this, can be attributed to their approach to wisdom. As for Plotinus, it is not that he does not have what he regards as textual support for his claim that his system is identical to Plato’s. We have already referred in a number of places to some of these texts as they were cited by earlier Platonists. But the deeper point is that his focus, like Aristotle’s, is on the truth. And again, like Aristotle, he believes the truth is attainable independently of the exegesis of any of one’s predecessors. As Plotinus says, there are numerous arguments one could employ to show the existence of a first principle of all. His citation of Platonic texts is always in support of the conclusion, never as a substitute for independent arguments for that conclusion. I suppose that this is at least part of what Proclus means when he speaks of the ‘Platonic revelation.’ On the matters for which Plato does argue, namely, for particular consequences of his fundamental principles , Plotinus is usually either silent or else he offers an interpretation that he believes to be most consistent with fundamentals. Often enough, Plotinus is dealing with matters that have arisen over the course of philosophy in the six hundred years or so between Plato and himself and on which Plato does not speak directly. In such cases, Plotinus will defend a position that he thinks anyone committed to the fundamental principles must take.4 We can also observe in Plotinus’s appeal to ‘ancient wisdom’ and in his use of the Platonic material that UP is a deep underlying assumption. As we will...