Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam

4. The “Sect” Crisis of 1955 and America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam

Chapter 4 The “Sect” Crisis of 1955 and America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam The “sect” crisis of March and April 1955 was the culmination of the open conflict between politico-religious forces and Ngo Dinh Diem’s government that began with the Hinh crisis the previous fall.1 In the prior standoff, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen leaders had backed down on realizing that American sympathy for their cause would not be forthcoming, and that without it they had no hope of compelling the prime minister to meet their demands. In the interim, they temporarily eased pressure on Ngo Dinh Diem, hoping that they might secure positions of power in his government and perhaps even support for their armed forces by cooperating with rather than threatening to expel him.Yet Ngo Dinh Diem surged ahead with his plans to divide and conquer his domestic political enemies. The politico-religious organizations therefore faced ongoing exclusion from meaningful positions in Ngo Dinh Diem’s government and increasingly bold efforts on his part to eliminate their existing power on the ground just as the deadline for the cessation of French subsidies to their armed forces drew near.In a desperate attempt to mobilize their existing power to preserve their endangered positions in the face of these mounting threats, the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen came together in a United Front of Nationalist Forces to engage in one last coordinated standoff with Ngo Dinh Diem.2 The “Sect” Crisis of 1955 and America’s Miracle Man 87 Throughout this clash,the United Front of Nationalist Forces continued previous efforts by politico-religious leaders to court French and American support.This would contribute to a growing rift between the French, who longed to see Ngo Dinh Diem replaced, and the United States, which remained committed to keeping him in power.The two powers had reached an entente in September 1954 predicated on a French pledge of support for Ngo Dinh Diem in exchange for assurances that the United States would consider alternatives if he faltered, but throughout the crisis both Paris and Washington would accuse each other of violating the agreement.3 The French, as doubtful as ever about Ngo Dinh Diem’s ability to retain power, were even more pessimistic about the future of French interests inVietnam should he manage to do so.4 They seized on the sect crisis as an opportunity to get the United States behind a plan to replace him with a new leader or a coalition government that might include politico-religious figures.American officials, however, persistently dismissed Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen politicians as selfish warlords, incompetent politicians, and agents of French imperialism.5 Washington also regarded a range of other nationalist politicians with suspicion,in most cases due to their histories of corruption, collaboration with the French, communication with the communists, or some combination thereof. Ngo Dinh Diem remained, to the Americans, the only palatable option for SouthVietnamese leadership. However, as the crisis wore on, they would be forced to grapple with alternatives. The Crisis in Context Washington’s frustration with the divisive nature of southernVietnamese politics, so readily on display during the final year of the French war and in the early months of Ngo Dinh Diem’s administration, continued unabated throughout the sect crisis. A New York Times article published at the zenith of Ngo Dinh Diem’s clash with the Binh Xuyen army exemplified the Americans’ quizzical attitude toward South Vietnam ’s politico-religious organizations.The April 29 headline proclaimed, “Struggle Weird inVietnam.”The author went on to explain,“The trouble in SouthVietnam is one part volatile nationalism and one part bizarre and chaotic struggle for power.”6 He even quoted Eisenhower calling the situation “strange and inexplicable,” a view the president seemed to share with most U.S. diplomats and politicians. Contrary to Eisenhower’s assertion that the clash between the government and the politico-religious 88 Chapter 4 organizations was impossible to explain,some sort of showdown in spring 1955 was, in fact, quite predictable within the context of the country’s recent political history. Tensions between Ngo Dinh Diem and his politico-religious adversaries had been building even prior to summer 1954, when Bao Dai appointed him prime minister.When he arrived in Saigon to assume the premiership in July 1954, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen leaders vowed to set...