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229 12 WASHINGTON’S POLICY SHIFT ON JAPAN AND MACARTHUR’S RESISTANCE, JANUARY 1948 TO JUNE 1950 Failure of the Proposal for an Early Peace Treaty with Japan On March 17, 1947, two-and-a-half months after the beginning of the second phase of public purges, which covered the economy, the press, and local administration , MacArthur used a press interview to call for an early peace treaty with Japan. At the time this was viewed as a sudden announcement, without any advance consultation with Washington. For MacArthur, however, it was no more than a restatement of his previous thinking. On February 20, for example, he had sent a message to the War Department, emphasizing that Japan had already achieved a democratic system and that people were enjoying its reality.1 History, he suggested, had shown that long military occupations were unable to achieve a positive effect.In fact,MacArthur’s argument for an early peace treaty was closely related to his desire to run in the 1948 presidential campaign. He dreamed of being nominated as the Republican Party candidate and being elected president.2 Successful administration of the Japanese Occupation would be an important asset during any campaign.Furthermore,if he could conclude the peace treaty,he could expect hero status from the American public. MacArthur’s aim was clear. The timing of his announcement, however, brought MacArthur failure. His announcement of a possible early peace treaty was made only five days after the March 12, 1947, announcement of the Truman Doctrine had marked the beginning of the cold war. From the perspective of both ideology and power politics, a new containment policy had been proposed in Washington. As chief 230 CHAPTER 12 administrator of the Occupation, MacArthur should have been more careful in assessing the world situation. In addition, he should have paid attention to the domestic situation in the United States, where it was clear that President Truman was expecting to be reelected. MacArthur’s poor timing was partly because his long tenure in Tokyo had made him insensitive to political movements far away in Washington, and partly because he had been planning his own presidential campaign. In practice, his announcement sparked conflict between Tokyo and Washington, and in particular, between Tokyo and the State and War departments . MacArthur’s treaty proposal was discussed in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department.A preliminary draft of the response,prepared by department staff on August 5, and based on the punitive policies of the Potsdam Declaration , not only demanded heavy reparations from Japan and the maintenance of military bases but also opposed Japanese rearmament. It proposed to establish an observation committee consisting of ambassadors from the eleven countries of the Far Eastern Committee (FEC), which would keep a close watch over any violations of the demilitarization policy and secure its achievements for twentyfive years after conclusion of the peace.3 The State Department had already begun preparations for a peace treaty conference by opening discussions with related governments.In July,it sent invitations to the ten other FEC nations to urge them to participate in a preliminary treaty conference in Washington on August 19, 1947. However, there was disagreement between the United States, which proposed decision making by majority, and the Soviet Union, which demanded the right to a veto. The preliminary conference was affected by the cold war. In the summer of 1948 the conference meeting was aborted because of these procedural objections. Washington’s Review of the Japan Occupation Policy In an international situation in which the cold war was gradually expanding into Asia, George F. Kennan, appointed in May 1947 as chief of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) of the State Department,was critical of the early Japanese peace treaty drafted by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. According to Kennan, the punitive draft paid too much attention to patient but firm and vigilant containment by the international powers, through which drastic demilitarization and democratization were to be achieved.4 Kennan was doubtful that international vigilance by nations such as the Soviet Union would contribute to Japanese democratization. Moreover, considering the unstable political situation of the Chiang Kai-shek POLICY SHIFT ON JAPAN AND MACARTHUR’S RESISTANCE 231 administration in mainland China, he considered Japan more important than China as a potential strategic factor in world politics. He emphasized, therefore, that promoting Japan’s economic recovery and stabilization should be a primary U.S. objective. Kennan’s view attracted attention at the...

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