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225 Conclusions and Recommendations In a few years people will not be able to understand how it was possible [to function] without what we are now creating [the INSC]. The country needs a governmental organ which has neither sectoral nor other interests and which can view things from a national and integrative perspective. —Uzi Dayan, former national security adviser The role of a staff body is to think coldly in [our] hot hallways. Most of the subjects we deal with are burning hot, ideologically and emotionally, and in a situation such as this it is hard to make cold analyses. . . . If we had an orderly staff body it might reduce the number of mistakes by about 10% and that is a huge amount. —Professor Yehezkel Dror, prominent Israeli political scientist Having looked at each of the seven case studies in detail separately, it is now time to take a broader, comparative look, to tie things together, draw the appropriate conclusions, and make recommendations. This chapter presents a comparative summary of the findings in the seven case studies, along with a discussion of the discrepancies between the posited and actual outcomes, and reviews the book’s key findings. It also reviews past attempts to reform the process, with particular emphasis on the INSC and the reasons it has yet to live up to its intended role, and argues that Israel can no longer afford its decision-making ills and continue business as usual. The chapter concludes with recommendations for further reforms needed on both the institutional and electoral levels in order for the process to improve . The Case Studies in Comparative Perspective Table 9 presents a comparative summary of the findings in each of the case studies. Table 9 Summary of the Findings in the Seven Case Studies Pathology Subdimensions of Pathologies Intensity of Manifestation in Case Studies Camp David 1978 Lavi Lebanon 1982 Lebanon Withdrawal 2000 Camp David 2000 Gaza Disengagement 2005 Lebanon 2006 Unplanned Pro cess Defi cient policy planning pro cesses; formulation of objectives, options High High High Moderate Low High High Improvisation Moderate High High Moderate Moderate High High Sequential decision making Low High High Moderate Moderate High High Politicized Pro cess Politics reign supreme Moderate High Moderate Low High High Low Co ali tion maintenance above all Moderate Low High Low High High Low Public opinion Moderate High High High High High High Semior ga nized Anarchy Premier not in charge Low ID Moderate Low High Moderate Low Dysfunctional cabinet/MCoD High High High Moderate High High High Leaks ID Low ID Low High Low High Uninstitutionalized Pro cess Idiosyncratic decision making High High High Low High High Moderate Policy disconnect; inputs, formulation, implementation ID High High Moderate Low Moderate High Insuffi cient policy coordination and integration High High High ID Low Moderate High Primacy of Defense Establishment IDF/defense establishment: source of expertise, “closed circle” High Moderate High High High Moderate High IDF/defense establishment: primary bureaucratic players High Moderate High High High Moderate High Defense minister/IDF positions prevail Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate High ID = Insuffi cient data CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 227 As is apparent from the table, all five pathologies were substantiated at a moderate to high level, as were fourteen of the fifteen subdimensions (leaks being the exception). None were substantiated completely, along all fifteen subdimensions and in all seven cases, nor would one expect them to be. Some variance is par for the course. The question is whether the exceptions indicate a fallacy of the posited pathology, a need for modification or further refinement, or the exigencies of a specific case. Given the qualitative nature of both the independent variables and resulting pathologies, a precise ranking of the latter’s relative importance is not feasible, but a few points are worthy of note. The unplanned nature of the process (Pathology 1) and the primacy of the IDF and defense establishment (Pathology 5) were the two most strongly substantiated pathologies , whereas the politicized and uninstitutionalized nature of the process (Pathologies 2 and 4) were somewhat less so. Semiorganized anarchy (Pathology 3) was manifested at a lower level than expected, but this was the outcome of the unexpected results achieved regarding the leaks subdimension . Conversely, the subdimension of cabinet dysfunctionality was one of the two most strongly manifested of all fifteen (along with public opinion, from Pathology 2). Among the other subdimensions, the deficiency of policy planning, idiosyncratic nature of the process, and the IDF and defense establishment ’s roles as...

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