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154 chapter seven Camp David II The Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, 1999–2000 Tell the Palestinians discreetly that we Israelis are built for a settlement “in one fell swoop,” all the issues, all the subjects, all the pain. As a people and society we are not built for agreements in stages, in which we will have to make continual political down payments. —Ehud Barak to his chief negotiator, May 2000 The Strategic Setting When Premier Ehud Barak took office in 1999 he inherited a mixed bag. Six years after the Oslo Agreement launched Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was in control of most of the Palestinian population, most of the territory of Gaza, and nearly half of the West Bank. Israel had recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiations designed to lead to a final agreement within five years. Terrorism, following the horrific spring of 1996, was comparatively low, Israel’s economy was booming, and the severe domestic tensions produced by the peace process, culminating in Rabin’s assassination in 1995, had subsided. The year 2000 promised to be—and was—an even better one economically, with the highest growth rates in decades both in Israel and the PA. By the late 1990s, however, many in Israel felt a growing sense of urgency regarding the conflict with the Palestinians. Even on the right many were coming to share the left’s long-standing fear that the Palestinians’ high birthrates posed an inexorable threat to Israel’s Jewish character. “Demography” became the driving force in Israeli politics and national security thinking, and an increasingly broad part of the political spectrum viewed withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza not as a threat but as an Israeli interest. CAMP DAVID II 155 Moreover, the preceding Netanyahu years had been a period of considerable foreign policy adversity for Israel. The dramatic steps Israel had taken for peace under Rabin and Peres and the ongoing Palestinian violence notwithstanding , the international community placed the primary onus for the failure of the peace process on Israel, and its international stature plummeted . In May 1999 “Oslo’s” five-year deadline for an agreement expired and Israel feared that a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood— their stated intention, unless agreement was reached by September—would be recognized by the vast majority of the world, including the United States, which would greatly exacerbate Israel’s isolation.1 Barak’s determination to transform the situation of Israel’s own accord provided him with a brief “honeymoon” with the international community, but heavy pressure was just around the corner. The beginning of Barak’s premiership in July 1999 was marred by terrorism , seven attacks in the first half of August alone, which continued throughout the negotiations. Security was thus a paramount consideration and Israel sought agreement on a variety of security arrangements, such as demilitarization and early warning sites. Much attention has been devoted to the question of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s complicity in the outbreak and continuation of the Intifada (uprising) in September 2000. One thing is clear. By February, eight months earlier, Israeli intelligence had already predicted , accurately, that mass Palestinian violence was likely to erupt later that year, especially if the peace process failed. In a chillingly prescient assessment on the eve of the Camp David Summit (July 12–25, 2000), Barak warned the cabinet that the summit’s failure would lead to thousands of casualties.2 The year 1999 was also one of growing concern in Israel over the broader trends in the region. Iraq appeared to be emerging from the international sanctions and inspections regime imposed on it, and its WMD capabilities were a source of great concern, as was Iran’s nuclear program. Both threats added a measure of urgency to Israel’s fundamental interest in peace with the Palestinians and Syria, in the hope that agreements could be reached before Iraq and Iran had gone nuclear. Israel’s security zone in southern Lebanon was increasingly viewed as a burden rather than a strategic asset, as Hezbollah engaged in a large-scale arms buildup and claimed a growing number of Israeli casualties. Pressure for a withdrawal from Lebanon, as noted in the preceding chapter, was growing. If regional trends were a source of concern, the timing nevertheless appeared to be propitious for negotiations. Agreements with the Palestinians and Syria were thought to be more likely while their aging leaders, Arafat and Assad respectively, were...

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