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75 II. THE CASE STUDIES It is not true that Israel’s cabinets never make the right decisions. They often do, but usually only after trying everything else. —Abba Eban, former Israeli foreign minister Part II presents the seven case studies. Each study is structured around the five pathologies held to be characteristic of Israeli decision making, as described in the preceding chapter. As could be expected, the intensity with which the pathologies were manifested varies by case. Some prove stronger across all of the cases and have greater explanatory power; others, less so, as will seen in the comparative analysis in the final chapter, “Conclusions and Recommendations.” The case studies include many of the most momentous decisions Israel has faced in recent decades, focusing primarily on the critical high-risk issues of war and peace, with all of the fundamental political, ideological, and strategic considerations they entail. The cases include two decisions to go to war, in Lebanon in 1982 and 2006; two attempts to make peace, with Egypt in 1977–1978 and the Palestinians in 2000; and two lesser but nevertheless crucial strategic decisions, the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005. The final case, the development of the Lavi combat aircraft program, is an “outlier,” seemingly just a matter of cold financial , technological, and strategic considerations, not highly charged political and ideological ones. If it, too, is found to manifest pathologies similar to those in the other cases, this will further substantiate the study’s findings regarding the posited nature of the DMP. The cases occurred under a variety of coalitions and thus at least partly discount potential differences stemming from the character of a given coalition or party. Environmental pressures, while significant in all of the cases, were not so extreme that Israel was compelled to act in certain ways, and its leaders had the freedom to choose from a number of policy options. All seven cases were selected because the initiative was at least partially in Israel’s THE CASE STUDIES 76 hands, thereby precluding the possibility that the unplanned nature of the process and other decision-making ills were the result of overwhelming environmental pressures, which did not leave Israel with much room to choose between policy options. Each case begins with an overview of the strategic setting in which the specific DMP took place, that is, the first of the three independent variables set out in the analytical model presented in the Introduction. It is important to note that the strategic overviews are designed not to be comprehensive portrayals of events, but to describe the forces that shaped the decisions of Israel’s leaders during the periods under discussion. The other two independent variables, the nature of Israel’s PR electoral system and the relative weakness of the civilian national security organs, remained fundamentally unchanged throughout the period under discussion and are thus not addressed in the cases. Table 1 presents a summary of the five pathologies and their subdimensions . Readers may find it of use in following their presentation in the case studies, which follows the same order. It should be noted that almost all of the subdimensions presented in Chapter 2 are analyzed in the case studies and thus appear in the table, with a few exceptions, either because the information available was insufficient to sustain a rigorous analysis, such as the posited oral nature of Israeli decision making, or, in one case, the question of its proactive or reactive nature, because the case studies, as noted above, were intentionally chosen for their at least partially proactive character . A comparative table, showing the intensity of the pathologies manifested in all seven cases appears in the “Conclusions and Recommendations .” Table 1 Pathologies and Subdimensions Pathology Subdimensions UnplannedPr ocess Deficient policy planning: absence of or avoidance of systematic policy formulation; ineffective formulation of objectives, priorities, and options; faulty or insufficient preparatory staff work Improvisation Sequential decision making PoliticizedPr ocess Politics reign supreme: focus on politics and consensus building, not policy; politics affect process; political grandstanding; time devoted to party and media; rivalry between premier and ministers Coalition maintenance above all: compromised policy; “what will fly”; minimum consensus necessary; procrastination Public opinion affects process Semiorganized Anarchy The premier is in charge sometimes: premier’s control of party and coalition and ability to realize desired policies; degree of political give and take; costs of obtaining policy approval Dysfunctional cabinet and MCoD: not true locus of decision making; absence of substantive policy debate...

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