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27 chapter two The Decision-Making Process How the System Actually Works The Report’s findings raise concerns regarding the quality of the decision-making process in the area of national security. —State Comptroller, Report on the National Security Council, September 2006 I have never understood what hides behind the linguistic code word “staff work.” . . . Should we assume a huge room with an oval table? And if we do it in a corner, with a low table, coffee and cookies, is this not staff work? Staff work is done through tens of daily phone calls and meetings and the premier sees the chief of staff at least twice a week. —Dov Weisglass, former bureau chief and senior adviser to Premier Ariel Sharon The previous chapter presented the three independent variables held to be the primary determinants of Israeli decision making. This chapter shows how the process is affected by these variables, with a focus on five resulting pathologies, the dependent variables. A summary of the various pathologies and their subdimensions is presented in tabular form at the end of Chapter 3 (Table 2 on p. 99). The chapter concludes with an analysis of the strengths of the Israeli DMP. Pathology 1: An Unplanned Process from reactive to proactive decision making? Many observers of Israeli decision making have traditionally held that its most conspicuous characteristic is its essentially reactive nature. Since the external environment has long been perceived to be highly unmalleable yet extremely dangerous, many decision makers have largely come to accept THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 28 their inability to foresee and shape it and have consequently adopted a reactive approach. Indeed, the persistent threat of imminent or actual hostilities has resulted in a nearly total preoccupation with the “thundering present ,”1 the here and now, and in the development of a DMP geared toward ad hoc responses to immediate problems. Given the constraints imposed by Israel’s environment, many of the issues it faces truly present only a narrow range of options, typically all unsatisfactory , and require immediate decisions in a highly uncertain and pressured atmosphere. Taking one’s time, seeing how things pan out, and exploring different options as events unfold are not typically part of the Israeli experience. According to one former minister, “long term planning is impossible. No one else plans and neither do you. In your subconscious you do not prepare long term plans and if you do, nothing comes of it. . . . All of the issues requiring long term planning are in a state of crisis.”2 It has been suggested, only partly in jest, that Israel was taken completely by surprise by the fiftieth anniversary celebrations in 1998 and by the millennium in 2000. How, indeed, could it have foreseen that they would occur in those years of all times? In classic fashion, it was prepared for neither and launched successful last-minute crash efforts to prepare for the celebrations . To take a serious example, following the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, it was clear to Israeli decision makers that another “round” with Hezbollah was just a question of time, due to the organization’s massive rocket buildup and determination to challenge Israel. Israel, however, ultimately responded only when a Hezbollah provocation became intolerable, not at the timing of its choosing or by taking the diplomatic or military initiative. Regarding the peace process, Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated over the decades that the ball was in the Arab court and that there was little Israel could do to change the situation. This reactive characteristic is greatly exacerbated, both in reality and in decision makers’ subjective perceptions, by chronic political instability and rapid coalition turnover and by the frenetic pace of change in the region. Israel’s only mixed success with past initiatives, both diplomatic and military , may have further reinforced its reactive tendencies. Although the SixDay War, attacks on the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear reactors, and other operations have been great military successes, other initiatives have left Israel’s leaders far less sanguine, inter alia, the Oslo Agreement, the Geneva and Camp David summits in 2000, and repeated operations in Lebanon. Nevertheless, in recent decades, as Israel has come to perceive its environment as being of at least somewhat greater malleability, a number of radical departures have taken place in Israeli policy, demonstrating a proactive ability to take bold initiatives. Indeed, every premier from Yitzhak Rabin until Benjamin Netanyahu (in his second term) has taken major diplomatic initiatives. They include Rabin’s Oslo Agreement...

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