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7 Summary and Expansion of Findings A good name is more valuable than money. Publius Cyrus, 42 b.c. The puzzle posed at the beginning of this book was whether a state’s reputation influences the behavior of other states, given the differences between the conventional wisdom and more critical scholarship on reputation published in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century. The general argument of this book is that states with reputations for being reliable allies will have greater autonomy in making their alliance choices than states with unreliable reputations. Although some of the specific hypotheses tested are more successful than others, the cases examined clearly show that a state’s reputation does influence its alliance autonomy. As a result, if government leaders care about their freedom of action in making alliance decisions, then they will pay attention to their state’s reputation as an ally. In this concluding chapter I will first summarize my findings from the four case study chapters, as well as addressing one of the findings that was not one of my original hypotheses—regarding the connection between reputation and the outbreak of conflicts—but which provides a new perspective on the outbreak of the First World War. I then apply my findings to two later cases in which reputation should influence state behavior—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the cold war and the U.S. “war on terror.” This is done to illustrate the applicability of my findings for other eras, including both bipolar and unipolar international systems. Finally, I discuss some other ways in which scholars can expand on this work, as well as additional areas of international relations that would benefit from further research on reputation, such as nonmilitary agreements and dealing with various forms of internal violence, including terrorism. Summary and Expansion of Findings 183 Summary of Findings from Case Studies To generate hypotheses for testing the role of reliability on state behavior, I have drawn heavily from the business literature, where positive reputations are believed to be crucial to the health of a firm, and where numerous scholarly works support the validity of that belief. If actors in the economic market are influenced by reputation, even though their commitments can be legally enforced, then states in the international political arena should also be influenced by reputation, since international commitments are selfenforcing and since prior behavior is frequently the only way to evaluate a state’s intentions under the condition of anarchy in the international system . Alliances in particular can improve a state’s security, but they can also leave a state more vulnerable. As a result, there should be observable differences in a state’s behavior toward those with reputations for reliability compared to those with reputations for being unreliable. My general argument is that as a state’s reliability is perceived to increase , it will have greater autonomy in its alliance choices. In contrast, as a state’s reliability is perceived to decline, it will be forced to give up autonomy while its allies will be less willing to part with their own. To test these general claims, I devised the five hypotheses presented in chapter 2. The first two hypotheses address gaps in our understanding of alliance formation : specifically, how states choose between different alliance strategies, such as balancing and bandwagoning, and also how they choose their alliance partners. Balance of power, balance of threat, and binding theories help us identify some of the strategies behind a state’s alliance choices, but they do not always explain situations in which states prefer one strategy over another, nor can they explain why states sometimes opt to not ally at all. In addition, even if we can identify why a state selects a particular strategy, it is often difficult to explain its choice of partners or the timing of its decisions. My first hypothesis predicts that states with a reputation for being unreliable will have more trouble finding allies than states with a reputation for reliability. Ceteris paribus, if states have a choice in alliance partners, they should prefer to ally with the more reliable state, since an agreement with that ally is more likely to enhance the state’s security. The market analogy behind this hypothesis is that firms with positive reputations have an easier time attracting employees, customers, and investors. If true, then states may balance against power or threat if a potential partner is reliable. If not, then bandwagoning or buck...

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