The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism

Appendix A. Definitions

313 a p p e n d i x a Definitions S is religious (or exhibits religion): (1) S takes there to be a reality that is ultimate, in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained. (2) S’s ultimate commitment is to the cultivation of dispositions appropriate to this state of affairs.1 S believes that p: S is disposed to apprehend the state of affairs reported by p, when that state of affairs comes to mind, under the concept reality.2 S believes in x: (1) S believes that x has value or is in some way a good thing. These definitions are taken from my Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), chaps. 1–6, to which source the reader is referred for fuller discussion. 1 For the meanings of “ultimate” and associated terms, see the Introduction. 2 Earlier in the chapter from which this definition is taken, I give this alternative definition of “S believes that p”: “S has a disposition such that (normally) it is only in the thick sense that the state of affairs reported by p comes to mind for S.” By “the thick sense” should be understood the sense we are using when, in saying that someone has thought of a state of affairs, we mean that he has had a thought of the relevant arrangement of things being actual. This is to be distinguished from the “thin” sense, which we are using when in uttering the same sentence we mean only that the person has had a thought of what it would be like if the relevant arrangement of things were actual. 314 Appendix A (2) S is disposed, when x comes to mind, to experience a feeling state that, when conjoined with the fact represented by (1), produces a blended experience of approving, trusting, and loyal emotions toward x. S possesses (propositional) religious belief: (1) S is disposed to apprehend the state of affairs reported by a certain proposition p, when that state of affairs comes to mind, under the concept reality. (2) p entails the existence of an ultimate and salvific reality. (3) p is independently capable of informing a religious practice. (4) S recognizes the religious character of her belief. S possesses (affective) religious belief: (1) S believes that a certain item x has value or is in some way a good thing. (2) At least a part of S’s reason for valuing x is that S values the existence of an ultimate and salvific reality or, more directly, the good obtainable in relation to such a reality, if it exists. (3) S is disposed, when x comes to mind, to experience a feeling state that, when conjoined with the facts represented by (1) and (2), produces a blended experience of approving, trusting, and loyal emotions toward x. S possesses (propositional) religious disbelief: (1) S is disposed to apprehend the state of affairs reported by a certain proposition p, when that state of affairs comes to mind, under the concept reality. (2) p entails the nonexistence of an ultimate and salvific reality. (3) S recognizes the nonreligious character of her belief. S possesses (affective) religious disbelief: (1) S believes that a certain item x has disvalue or is in some way a bad thing. Definitions 315 (2) At least a part of S’s reason for disvaluing x is that S disvalues the valuing of the existence of an ultimate and salvific reality or, more directly, disvalues the valuing of a good obtainable in relation to it, if it exists. (3) S is disposed, when x comes to mind, to experience a feeling state that, when conjoined with the facts represented by (1) and (2), produces a blended experience of disapproving and distrusting emotions toward x. S is a religious skeptic: S is in doubt and/or withholds judgment, because of the apparent inconclusiveness of the relevant evidence, with respect to (i) this or that particular religious proposition or limited set of religious propositions (common skepticism), or (ii) the proposition that there is an ultimate and salvific reality (categorical skepticism), or (iii) the proposition—qualified or unqualified—that human beings are capable of discovering at least some basic truths concerning such a reality (capacity skepticism), or (iv) both (ii) and (iii) together (complete skepticism).3 S has...