The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism

6.The Bearing of Pragmatic Considerations

118 c h a p t e r 6 The Bearing of Pragmatic Considerations To the conclusion of the previous chapter, a proviso must now be added: provided that there are no non-truth-oriented, pragmatic considerations with sufficient countervailing force. Everything we have said so far in the book has been said on the assumption that only truth-oriented or epistemic considerations are relevant to the justification of believing, disbelieving, and skeptical responses to ultimism. This is in line with the procedure for evaluating such responses outlined at the end of my Prolegomena (p. 217). After having identified various problems facing a non-truth-oriented or pragmatic or justificationally pluralist approach, I stated there that philosophers should begin by applying a truth-oriented criterion. But I also noted that out of respect for the deepest pluralist idea, which urges sensitivity to goodness in all its forms, and to ensure that no mistake is made in dealing with this important matter, philosophers might be expected at least to entertain the possibility that whatever conclusion truth-oriented considerations support—whether a conclusion in some way affirming a believing response, or a disbelieving one, or else some form of skepticism—should be altered in light of non-truth-oriented considerations pointing to a better or equally good alternative response. With respect to a defense of skepticism in particular, it was suggested that the following principles, which refer not just to the weakness of evidence but also to the non-applicability of pragmatic considerations, should be utilized. P20. A skeptical response is negatively justified if (1) available information does not permit a judgment of sufficient and overall good evidence for either the truth of the proposition that would be believed in a believing response or the truth of the The Bearing of Pragmatic Considerations 119 proposition that would be believed in a disbelieving response; and (2) there are no non-truth-oriented considerations with sufficient force to show some alternative response to be better, and thus preferable in the circumstances. P21. A skeptical response is positively justified if (1) it is negatively justified, and (2) there are no non-truth-oriented considerations with sufficient force to show some alternative response to be as good, and thus equally worthy of being made in the circumstances. (Prolegomena, p. 219) It will be evident that I have so far been arguing in support of the view that, where the proposition at issue is ultimism or its denial, condition (1) of P20 is satisfied: our modes of religious skepticism have in various ways sought to show that available information does not permit a judgment of sufficient and overall good evidence for the truth of either of these propositions . But now, taking to heart my own advice, I will consider the bearing of pragmatic considerations on this skeptical conclusion, asking whether the second condition of each of these principles is also satisfied. My answer will in each case be an affirmative one. Indeed, I will be arguing that, so far from disturbing our skepticism, pragmatic considerations actually strengthen it. Religious skepticism, in other words, faces no threat from religious pragmatism, but can make of it an ally. 1. The Benefits of Belief I shall begin by considering what non-truth-oriented considerations might be marshaled in support of the alternative response to ultimism involving belief, and assessing their force. As a preface, though, let me offer a small clarification concerning “non-truth-oriented considerations.” It would be natural to understand this phrase as referring to considerations suggesting ways in which a believing response might be thought good that do not involve its conduciveness to an awareness of the truth of any proposition. But this is a somewhat more strict interpretation than the one I shall adopt. It is true that most of the prima facie good-making properties that would be mentioned in this connection apparently have nothing to do with the truth of ultimism. In Prolegomena (p. 210) the sample list looked like this: “being conducive to the fulfillment of moral obligation or the development or expression of moral virtue, being conducive to psychologically healthy functioning, to an interesting life, to understanding, to wisdom, to consciousness (as opposed to ignorance 120 Seven Modes of Religious Skepticism and gullibility, especially about oneself), to creativity, to the general happiness...