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7 Immigrants, Paramilitaries, and Turf 158 Immigration to Ireland and Northern Ireland is a recent phenomenon. In 1845, on the eve of the potato famine, the population of the island stood at approximately eight million people. Five years later, it had declined by over a third, with one million people succumbing to starvation and disease and another two million emigrating, mostly to America (American Immigration Law Foundation 2001; O’Grada 1995). In the century and a half that followed, both Ireland and Northern Ireland continued to send émigrés to locations across the globe. In the south, most migrants left for economic reasons: the Republic’s economy was unable to sustain all of its working-age population. Irish rituals were even adapted to reflect the place of out-migration in the culture . The American wake, a funeral fete for émigrés about to cross the Atlantic , was given in recognition that most would die in America. In Northern Ireland, emigration rates were much lower because of industrialization in Belfast and smaller cities like Derry. Residual tensions from partition, however , meant that few outsiders wanted to relocate to the province’s humming industrial zones, so in-migration was minimal. After the Troubles erupted, net out-migration became the norm. During 1971–72, the most violent period of the conflict, the province recorded an out-migration of 20,400 persons (Hutchinson and Simpson 2000). During the 1980s, net migration to Scotland and England alone was around 9,000 persons a year (Mulholland 2002). In the early 1990s, things began to change in both Ireland and Northern Ireland. In the Republic, the economy took off, attracting light manufacturing , hi-tech firms, and professional services related to both. Pundits took to calling Ireland the Celtic Tiger (O’Hearn 1998; Sweeney 2000).1 In Northern 1 Irish economist David McWilliams is credited with dubbing Ireland “the Celtic Tiger” in 1994. He used the term to liken Ireland to countries like Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore , which had been labeled “East Asian Tigers” in the late 1980s for their phenomenal export-led growth (Wikipedia 2005b). Ireland growth was less striking but still significant. The cease-fires in 1994 and the peace accord four years later gave a measurable boost to the province’s sagging economy. For the first time in living memory, people on both sides of the border began to witness an utterly unfamiliar phenomenon—positive net migration. In Northern Ireland the 2001 census counted 157,410 new migrants to the province (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency [NISRA] 2001c). Immigrants to Northern Ireland are a diverse lot; most are nonwhite and come from cultural traditions quite different from those of the province’s two ethnoreligious blocs. In-migration is a recent phenomenon, however, so the total number of immigrants remains low. Indeed, although it is not a perfect measure of immigration,2 the percentage of ethnic minorities in the province today continues to indicate overwhelming racial homogeneity. According to the 2001 Census, over 99.15 percent of the population is white. Even Belfast, where most new migrants land, is still 98.63 percent white. The largest ethnic minority in the province is Chinese, followed closely by migrants from South Asia (NISRA 2001b). Despite their low numbers, a backlash has developed against the province’s nonwhite residents/migrants. The backlash is manifested in a variety of ways, from discrimination in housing and employment to harassment, physical assault, and attacks on homes. The problem is a rapidly growing one as well. In 1998–99, the PSNI recorded 93 racial incidents in the province.3 Five years later, in 2003–4, the number had risen to 453 (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 2005). The occurrence of racial incidents has been geographically concentrated, with most attacks occurring inside Belfast, and within the city, in its southern quadrant where almost one-third of all attacks occurred in 2003–4 alone (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 2005). The backlash against the province’s new migrants is disturbing but not without precedent. Similar strife has arisen in other western European capitals dealing with heightened numbers of immigrants in the post–cold war period (Lahav 2004; Sassen 2000). What makes the backlash unique in Northern Ireland is the involvement of paramilitaries in the process. To date, the majority of involvement has been by Loyalist rather than Republican paramilitaries (Rolston 2004). Loyalist paramilitary involvement has taken many forms. In some cases, members have participated in harassment and intimidation on an individual Immigrants...

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