The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma
Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm
Publication Year: 2011
Why did election monitoring become an international norm? Why do pseudo-democrats-undemocratic leaders who present themselves as democratic-invite international observers, even when they are likely to be caught manipulating elections? Is election observation an effective tool of democracy promotion, or is it simply a way to legitimize electoral autocracies? In The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma, Susan D. Hyde explains international election monitoring with a new theory of international norm formation. Hyde argues that election observation was initiated by states seeking international support. International benefits tied to democracy give some governments an incentive to signal their commitment to democratization without having to give up power. Invitations to nonpartisan foreigners to monitor elections, and avoiding their criticism, became a widely recognized and imitated signal of a government's purported commitment to democratic elections.
Hyde draws on cross-national data on the global spread of election observation between 1960 and 2006, detailed descriptions of the characteristics of countries that do and do not invite observers, and evidence of three ways that election monitoring is costly to pseudo-democrats: micro-level experimental tests from elections in Armenia and Indonesia showing that observers can deter election-day fraud and otherwise improve the quality of elections; illustrative cases demonstrating that international benefits are contingent on democracy in countries like Haiti, Peru, Togo, and Zimbabwe; and qualitative evidence documenting the escalating game of strategic manipulation among pseudo-democrats, international monitors, and pro-democracy forces.
Published by: Cornell University Press
Title Page, Copyright
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FIGURES AND TABLES
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...2.2. Diffusion of elections and election observation by region 672.1. Observed elections and Cold War alliances, 1962–1988 682.2. Observed elections and Cold War alliance patterns, 1989–1994 694.5. Carter Center observation coverage of villages in Indonesia 1484.6. Summary statistics for all available village-level variables 149...
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Although I did not know it at the time, this book began its life in the fall of 2001 as my fi rst research paper in graduate school. As a result, nearly everyone with whom I have come in professional contact has helped me write this book, and my debts are immense. I have been fortunate to re-ceive numerous sources of institutional support during the research, writ-...
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In October of 1958, the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista was one of the fi rst leaders to seek international observation of his country’s elections. Facing declining U.S. support of his regime, pressure from the United States to hold elections, and a growing threat from Fidel Castro’s revolu-tionary forces, Batista scheduled elections, announced he would not run ...
1SIGNALING DEMOCRACYAND THE NORM OFINTERNATIONALLYOBSERVED ELECTIONS
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Since the end of the Cold War, international election observation has at-tracted signifi cant attention from policymakers and practitioners of for-eign aid, democracy promotion, and postconfl ict political development as a useful and widely accepted tool to help facilitate democratic elections. For scholars of international relations and comparative politics, especially ...
2SOVEREIGN LEADERSAND THE DECISION TOINVITE OBSERVERS
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The Costa Rican elections of February 1962 are widely cited as the fi rst internationally observed election in a sovereign state, but they were not the fi rst elections for which a government had sought international ob-servers.1 Four years earlier, the democratizing government of Costa Rica and the threatened Cuban dictatorship each attempted to invite inter-...
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As of January 2005, Ethiopia received nearly a third of its total budget from the United States and European Union member states. It was one of the leading aid recipients in Africa, and prior to parliamentary elections in 2005, the country was considered a darling of the donor community on the African continent, setting an example of relative stability, economic growth, ...
4DOES ELECTIONMONITORING MATTER?
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Are international election monitors more costly to pseudo-democrats than to true democrats? In this chapter, I continue investigating the con-sequences of internationally monitored elections as they relate to norm formation and show that the presence of international observers correlates with several types of costs to incumbent leaders. I also use experimental ...
5THE QUALITY OF MONITORING ANDSTRATEGIC MANIPULATION
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The norm of election monitoring is that governments committed to dem-ocratic elections invite international monitors. The corresponding belief is that noninviting states must be electoral autocracies, unless the country has otherwise established a reputation as a consolidated democracy. Be-cause of the belief that all true democrats invite observers, and because ...
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Prior to the 2006 Belarusian election, President Aleksander Lukashenko invited observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the National Democratic Institute, and the Com-monwealth of Independent States. Reportedly a popular incumbent, Lu-kashenko nevertheless engaged in many forms of electoral manipulation, ...
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The theory presented in chapter 1 is based on a signaling game, which is outlined briefl y in this appendix. The game models the decision by incumbent governments to invite international observers. It is a fi nite game of imperfect information, in which incumbent governments can signal their commitment to democratic elections by inviting observers ...
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Data used in the cross-national empirical analysis come from both origi-nal data collection efforts and pre-existing sources. All sources are cited, summarized, and referenced in relation to individual variable defi nitions, Original data collection efforts took place in two stages. First, it was necessary to collect data on national level election events from 1960 to ...
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Note that all newspaper and news wire sources are cited in the relevant Abbink, Jon, and Gerti Hesseling, eds. Election Observation and Democratization in Africa. Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. “Values and Interests: International Legaliza-tion in the Fight against Corruption.” Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2002): 141–178.Aguila, Juan M. del. Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution, 3rd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview ...
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Page Count: 248
Publication Year: 2011