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Notes Chapter 1 1. “Anglo-Saxon capitalism” is a common synonym for liberal market economy. 2. For summaries of the debate, see Berger (2000); Guillén (2001); and Drezner (2001). 3. The distributional consequences of institutions and the political realities associated with their change are detailed in Knight (1992) and Pierson (2004). 4. On variations in incremental reforms, see Streeck and Thelen (2005b) and Mahoney and Thelen (2009). 5. The average economic openness of EU members, measured by exports and imports as a share of gross domestic product, increased five-fold in the six decades since 1950 to approximate 100 percent (author’s calculation based on Heston, Summers, and Aten 2006). From 1957 to 2008, enforceable international legal mandates associated with the European Union and its precursors (regulations and directives) went from zero to reaching nearly 10,000 distinct instruments (Eur-lex 2010). 6. The periodization in this book stresses economic parameters that affected all countries discussed .The first period begins in 1950 during significant if uncertain economic expansion. It ends in 1973, a date around which there is broad consensus that the so-called Golden Age of post-war capitalism was over. The second period, 1974–1991, is marked by international economic crises and responses to these crises that included major multilateral initiatives like the European Economic Community’s internal market program that targeted 1992 as the date of completion. The year 1992 represents the beginning of the third period, also marked by the signing of Treaty on European Union, and ends with the onset of the global economic crisis of 2008. 7. For discussions of criteria for contextualized comparisons, see George and Bennett (2005, 151–180). 8. Multilateral rules associated with the European Union impact terms of competition, the structure of capital markets, industrial relations, social regulations, and a host of other areas with direct relevance for corporate strategy. For general developments in these and other domains, see Hooghe and Marks (2001, 187–188); Hix (2005, 20–21); and Sandholtz and Fligstein (2001). 9. Partial equilibrium analysis, which characterizes much of the comparative and international political economy subfields, holds variables at one level constant while examining changes at a different level. For example, studies examine how changes in international rules affect responses at the national level, or how different national regimes affect the construction of international rules. By contrast, general equilibrium analysis examines how changes in variables at both levels affect the stability of institutions over time. 194 Notes to Pages 11–16 10. What in 1991 became known as the European Union (formally becoming operational in 1993) has historical origins in other organizations. When referring to precursor organizations, the narrative uses period-appropriate names. 11. Society-centered theories of political economy in which interest groups shape national reform agendas often imply that such groups (directly or indirectly) determine government choices. This volume makes no claim about what role such groups play in leading governments to pursue a particular set of reforms. Rather it focuses on how successful governments are in sustaining support for their reforms over time after choices have been made. Although the ability of societal groups to shape government agendas may have bearing on whether they later supported the reforms championed by governments, the latter dimension is treated here as an open empirical question. 12. For extended discussions on the analytical stakes in specifying the preferences of societal groups, see Frieden (1999), and Katznelson and Weingast (2005b). 13. For an overview, see Coen, Grant, and Wilson (2010). 14. Historical institutionalists debate the extent to which critical junctures transform preferences . If preferences are defined materially, for example by the distribution of factor endowments, then critical junctures like economic crises and wars would not be expected to significantly change the course of economic governance. If preferences have institutional and cognitive foundations, however, critical junctures can be expected to be more significant in altering preferences. Yet, historical institutionalists find evidence that institutional preferences often prevail across major historical junctures and that they frequently change in their absence (Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005a). It is exactly because preference transformations are contextually contingent that the manner in which pivotal political groups frame the benefits of alternative modes of change is integral to a theory of institutional development. 15. In international relations studies, where behavioral economics features more extensively than in political economy, the focus has been on the decisions of political elites. See Levy (1992), (McDermott 2004), and Mercer (2005) for overviews. For a discussion of its potential contributions...

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