An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy

25. OPERATION EAGLE CLAW

263 25 OPERATION EAGLE CLAW On April 11, 1980, Jimmy Carter opened a foreign policy breakfast meeting in the Cabinet Room:“Gentlemen, I want you to know that I am seriously considering an attempt to rescue the hostages.”The president continued,“A team of expert paramilitary people now report that they have confidence on their ability to rescue our people.” With these statements, Hamilton Jordan’s heart raced:“He’s going to do it!” he said to himself,“He’s had enough!”1 At that point the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Jones, spread out a big map on the table, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown elaborated on the various stages of the mission. All present at the meeting seemed to be in agreement. Vice President Walter Mondale said he was inclined to attempt the rescue. Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke glowingly about the members of the Delta team and their previous training and backgrounds;2 at one point, he reminded the group that the nights would be getting shorter so the operation should be undertaken as soon as possible, and he proposed that prisoners be taken as well as retaliatory steps against the Iranians at the same time as the rescue operation.Otherwise,he did not talk much,letting others carry the call. Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner was positive but cautioned Jones about the conditions inside Iran. The Secretary of Defense Harold Brown argued that that rescue was the best option for bringing the hostages home. Press Secretary Jody Powell agreed. Warren Christopher, who was sitting in for Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, said that he could not accurately represent his feelings because he had not yet discussed the mission with Vance. By the end of the meeting, Carter was on board for the rescue mission, named Operation Eagle Claw.As Jordan observed,“The overwhelming logic of Harold’s point carried the day. The other military options and sanctions wouldn’t bring the hostages home, but the highly specialized Delta team probably could.”3 The one individual who would have raised questions about the dangers and political consequences of such an operation, Secretary of State Vance, was not at the meeting .At Camp David on March 22,he had argued that the hostages would be freed only when the institutions of the Islamic Republic had solidified and Ayatollah Khomeini had no further political use for them.4 The likelihood of physical harm to them was less than it had been, and eventually the situation inside Iran would make negotiations possible. But on this day, April 11, Vance was in Florida for a short, much-needed rest. No attempt was made to contact him before or after the rescue decision was made.5 Upon his return to Washington,D.C.,on April 14,Vance was dismayed that such a “momentous decision”had been made in his absence. He asked for a National Security 264 FINALE Council meeting to hear his objections. At a meeting on April 15, Vance delineated his concerns: 1. America’s allies were moving toward sanctions based on the belief that they would help the United States avoid military action. Going ahead with the mission without warning or consulting these allies would be seen as a betrayal of their trust. 2. The mission involved possible armed confrontations among hostages, crew, and Iranians. It could result in many deaths. 3. U.S. interest in the whole region could be severely damaged. The Islamic world would be outraged, causing a larger Western-Islamic conflict. 4. Even if the rescue mission were successful, the Iranians could react by taking new hostages, especially with all the American journalists in the area.6 When Vance had finished, the president asked if there were any reactions to his comments. An awkward silence ensued. Jordan, possibly projecting some of his own feelings, described Vance as scanning the room, “looking from Zbig to Mondale to Harold Brown, to Jody, and finally to me, his eyes begging for support. I fidgeted, feeling sorry for Cy, who sat there all alone.”7 Carter broke the silence and personally dealt with many of Vance’s objections.8 After four months of planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were confident that the plan would succeed. In addition, Carter argued that (1) our allies—who were not making a great effort at supporting us—would be relieved if the rescue mission worked; (2) the mission was designed so that it could be stopped at several points...