The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

4. The United States Crosses the 38th Parallel

AFTER THE NORTH KOREAN attack across the 38th parallel of June 25, 1950, the United States rushed to aid the collapsing South Korean forces. Through the summer of 1950, the ground war went poorly for the South Korean and U.S. forces, which were pushed back in a long retreat to the Pusan Perimeter. After that line solidified in early August, however, the Inchon landings of September 15 were a success, forcing the United States to consider more directly whether to cross the 38th parallel, how to do so, and what the strategic goals would be once it did so. The Chinese sent a large number of signals—both explicit and implicit—to the United States, warning it against continuing its offensive. Washington, however, disregarded these signals in the belief that the Chinese would not get involved. The Americans drove north. The PLA attacked, first in late October and early November in modest scale, and second in late November with a massive force (the first and second offensives, in the Chinese parlance). These attacks fundamentally altered the course of the conflict, which would over the next three years take more than a million lives. It also further hardened the Cold War.1 The failure of Chinese attempts to coerce the United States into staying south of the 38th parallel, then, merits careful consideration. In this chapter I outline the role that the two sides’ theories of victory played in this colossal failure of communication and perception. Although 1 Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1980). 4 the united states crosses the 38th parallel Figure 4.1. The American offensive in Korea, October 7–26, 1950. Mukden Wonsan SEA OF JAPAN YELLOW SEA Iwon C H I N A Anju Hungnam Y a l u R i v e r 26 Oct. 26 Oct. 23 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 14 Oct. 7 Oct. 7 Oct. 7 Oct. X xxx EIGHTH xxxx EIGHTH xxxx III I87 Boundary between Eighth Army and X Corps effective 24 Oct. Initial Chinese counterattack began 25 Oct. and lasted until 6 Nov. 1st Marine Division, under X Corps, began administrative unloading on 26 Oct. 7th Infantry Division, part of X Corps, was to follow, but plans changed to divert that division north. U.S. 3d Infantry Division remained in reserve. Chinese lines of advance United Nations lines of advance 0 0 40 60 20 80 km 30 40 20 10 50 mi Hagaru P’yongyang Seoul Chosin Reservoir Ch’ongjin T ’ A E B A E K M O U N T A I N S THE UNITED STATES CROSSES THE 38TH PARALLEL 89 there were other factors that played a role, most of which are subsumed under the Weakness Hypothesis in this book, doctrinal difference is a critical part of this story that has gone unappreciated. Key elements of the conventional wisdom have been overstated: MacArthur’s complacency was not unique and indeed was shared by many military leaders. Nor can poor signals intelligence or Chinese deception account for the failures. The evidence presented below suggests that doctrinal difference were a necessary condition for this tragedy. In short, this chapter tells of “a time of signals sent but not received.”2 historical background Among scholars of the Korean War, there had long been a debate over the role of the Soviets and the Chinese in the outbreak of the Korean War. There is now enough evidence to end the debate. Scholars have long known that Beijing, like Moscow, had been a strong supporter of the Communists in the North.3 Kim Il Sung consulted regularly with the Chinese leadership and in early 1950 the CCP’s Central Committee ordered that three divisions who had been fighting on the Communist side in the Chinese civil war should return to Korea, keeping their weapons.4 Even more critical than this direct military support for the North was Mao’s formal approval of Kim Il Sung’s attack, an issue upon which there is now widespread consensus.5 (The following chapter 2 David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 334. 3 On this support in general, see 宋连生、 《抗美援朝在回首》(昆明、云南人民出版社、2002) [Song Liansheng, Recollections on the Korean War (Kunming: Yunnan People’s Press, 2002), 172–73]. 4 蔡仁照、 《中国元师聂荣臻》(北京:中共中央党校出版社、 1994). pp. 445...