The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

2. Doctrinal Differences and Misperception

DOCTRINAL-DIFFERENCE THEORY states that when nations have different doctrines and hold different beliefs about what kinds of military strategies and capabilities may be effective, diplomacy and signaling will be more difficult, and this can cause escalation or conflict. In this chapter, the two stages of this process are expressed as a pair of hypotheses: first, the doctrinal-difference misperception (DDM) hypothesis, suggests how the differences in beliefs lead to misperception; the second, doctrinal-difference escalation (DDE) hypothesis, explains how this may, in turn, cause miscommunication and crisis outcomes such as escalation or even violent conflict. Their logic is sketched out in the next section of this chapter. An alternative explanation for failed coercion is also laid out, one emphasized in the existing literature: the weakness hypothesis, which focuses on a failure to send strong signals in a crisis. Then, the predictions that follow from these hypotheses are specified: that is, what should we expect to find in the cases studied in chapters 3 through 7? The chapter concludes with an explanation of the methodology of the inquiry reflected in the rest of this book. strategic coercion and theories of victory: definitions and the universe of cases Two terms important to this study are strategic coercion, which is part of the definition of the universe of cases studied here, and theories of victory. 2 doctrinal differences and misperception DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AND MISPERCEPTION 19 the project’s universe of cases: attempts at strategic coercion Strategic coercion encompasses a large universe of cases, since “the use of intimidation of one kind or another in order to get others to comply with one’s wishes is an everyday occurrence in human affairs.”1 For my purposes, strategic coercion is the process by which one nation tries to convince another nation to do something it would not otherwise have done, through implicit or explicit threats and limited uses of violence, either to thwart the adversary’s action or to punish it. Three distinctions that are commonly made in the field are not pertinent here: compellence versus deterrence, general versus immediate deterrence, and peacetime crisis diplomacy versus signaling in a limited war. In each case, the reasons for differentiation are not important for my purposes, and so all will be conflated under the term coercive diplomacy . (However, rare instances of total—rather than limited—war are excluded .) This usage is consistent with that of other scholars in the field. Lawrence Freedman defined “strategic coercion” as “the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.”2 For him, both deterrence and compellence are both part of a “threat based bargaining process.”3 As he notes, the historical origins of each term have somewhat exaggerated the difference between deterrence and compellence: [Although] deterrence and coercive diplomacy . . . are two sides of the same coercive coin, the difference between them came to be exaggerated through the research that they stimulated. The study of deterrence was largely concerned with the United States’ essentially symmetrical relationship with the Soviet Union, while [compellence ] was bound up with its asymmetrical relationship with smaller powers.4 1 Alexander L. George, “Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 2. Indeed the limitation of “human affairs” may be too narrow; see Christopher Boehm, “Egalitarian Behavior and the Evolution of Political Intelligence,” in Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, ed. Andrew Whiten and Richard W. Byrne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 342. 2 Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Lawrence Freedman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 15. 3 Freedman, introduction to in Strategic Coercion, 3. 4 Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” 32. 20 THE MILITARY LENS In practice, the lines separating the various forms of compellence, deterrence , and coercion are not so clear, as nearly all scholars working in the field have noted.5 Similarly, although there may be circumstances when it is useful to separate general from immediate deterrence,6 these two concepts are better viewed as part of a continuum. General deterrence can fail for the same reasons that immediate deterrence does: because of questions about capability and intent.7 Doctrinal-difference theory has implications for both kinds of questions. The approach I adopt includes both threats and the use of force if it has some...