Just Politics: Human Rights and the Foreign Policy of Great Powers

[1] Humanitarianism and Commitment Termination

Democratic states sometimes terminate commitments to strategic partners . Why does this occur? In my effort to answer this question, I specifically draw on three approaches to international politics: realism, institutionalism , and humanitarian norms—this being a hybrid liberal-constructivist framework. Each approach presents unique explanations of commitment termination. The first two—realism and institutionalism—reflect the conventional wisdom discussed in the prior chapter. I also discuss the methodology of the project and the logic of using case studies from the specific core British and U.S. security commitments at hand. Humanitarian Norms A humanitarian norms explanation of commitment termination combines elements of both constructivist and liberal thought. As such, it brings liberal norms into the picture and explores the ways that institutions serve as conveyors of those norms. In the context of strategic commitments , I anticipate that legislatures will force executives to terminate pledges when partners act illiberally and activist groups apply pressure for policy change. In the absence of patterned illiberalism by partners or certain levels of activist pressure, commitments are likely to be preserved. A couple of qualifications are important. First, this book focuses on political , as opposed to economic and social, rights. The reason for this is that most of the humanitarian movements addressing the foreign policy of great powers have revolved around issues like life, liberty, and human dignity.1 Second, the argument rests on a single assumption. Namely, once legislatures adopt anti-commitment interests, the executive will terminate [1] Humanitarianism and Commitment Termination [8] pledges. In reality, policymaking is not always as straightforward as this assumption implies. Executives sometimes defy legislative objectives, even those encoded in law. The Reagan administration’s decision to provide covert aid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua despite congressional restrictions is one memorable example. Politics matters as to when executives respect legislative preferences. For space reasons, I do not explore the political cost-benefit calculations of these executive decisions. It should be noted, though, that in most instances, when legislatures act, they tend to get their way eventually. Once Reagan’s actions became public , for example, aid to the Contras abruptly ended, an outcome that would not have transpired without legislative pressure. Liberal Thought and Humanitarianism Understanding legislative humanitarian action begins with an exploration of the basic identities of democratic states. Liberalism is the central legitimating worldview, or core identity, of modern democratic states. I define liberalism as a system of thought rooted in the autonomy and equality of the individual. Liberal scholars explore how these ideas serve as the foundation for humanitarian concern and action internationally. On this score, liberal societies reify the “equal worth and dignity of each and every person [regardless of] social utility” and respect the basic political right to “equal concern and respect.”2 Choice of the life one leads becomes a critical factor. “Equal and autonomous rights-bearing individuals are entitled to make fundamental choices about what constitutes the good life (for them), with whom they associate, and how,” notes Jack Donnelly.3 Liberty to define the good life is not license, however, to pursue one’s wishes regardless of others. The autonomy of one can not be used to hinder the autonomy and equality of another. Noncoercion and tolerance therefore emerge as valuable to any liberal conception of society. Individuals stand free to define the good as they please as long as it does not encroach upon the capacity of another individual to do the same. The state plays an important role as a servant toward this end. Government receives “its power from the governed with whom . . . [it] signed a contract.”4 The purpose of the state becomes consistent with what society values, namely, autonomy and equality. John Locke captured the place and responsibility of the liberal state: “[State] power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of society. It is a power that has no other end but preservation, and, therefore, can never have a right to destroy, enslave or designedly to impoverish its subjects.”5 For Locke and other liberals, the state role includes the active element, as well, of limiting Humanitarianism and Commitment Termination [9] excesses by one individual within society against another.6 Under these conditions, liberals expect the greatest potential for human flourishing. No doubt some contemporary liberals take issue with this strictly contractarian bent, claiming that it misses the responsibility of the...