Laying the BRICS of a New Global Order: From Yekaterinburg 2009 to eThekwini 2013

22. South Africa in BRICS: Substance or Piggybacking?

399 CHAPTER 22 South Africa in BRICS: Substance or Piggybacking? Gerrit Olivier INTRODUCTION S outh Africa’s membership of BRICS coincides with and underscores the basic philosophy and dictates of the new paradigm 1 underpinning its post-1994 foreign policy, particularly regarding its new national identity , mode of identification towards the outside world and role perception in global and regional politics. The new foreign policy paradigm reposes on four main pillars: the domestic pillar, the African Agenda (regional and continental) pillar, the Bandung or South-South solidarity pillar and the multi-lateral pillar. All the other strands of South Africa’s foreign policy are secondary. They feed into the overarching rationale represented by these pillars. ■ First, the domestic pillar places special emphasis on security and welfare; that is, wealth creation, the eradication of poverty and ending the marginalisation of the poor (White Paper, 2011:7). ■ Second, the African Agenda pillar ‘seeks to and has positioned South Africa (SA) as a critical player in shaping the development agenda of the continent’.2 ■ Third, the Bandung pillar of non-alignment shapes SA’s understanding of South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism as a natural extension of its national interest.3 ■ Fourth is the Multi-lateral pillar. SA sees an important role for itself in the strengthening and transformation of the multi-lateral system. This particularly means obtaining a permanent African membership on the UN Security Council, achieving closer cooperation between the latter and the African Union, reforming the global financial architecture , promoting respect for international law and supporting 400 multi-lateralism as a way to ensuring a rules-based international system. Therefore, in the context of SA’s overarching foreign policy doctrine, BRICS’ membership was a major achievement for the country’s diplomacy. It promises to elevate the country to a league in global affairs which is much higher than its size and power status objectively warrants. In particular, it corroborates the high premium placed on SA’s pivotal position as an African state, as well as its role in multi-lateral diplomacy, while its inclusion renders the BRICS conglomerate more ‘representative’ from a geopolitical perspective.4 Should the country manage to respond in kind with the high-quality diplomacy and strategic clarity the situation calls for, its national interests could benefit greatly in time. A focused, qualitative response is particularly imperative given the fact that critics suggest that the country does not really qualify to play in the BRICS league, citing its small size, inferior global power status relative to the other members (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China) and the fact that countries like South Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and possibly Nigeria, are better qualified for membership of the power club. Moreover, the ambivalence-cum-reluctance of some African states towards recognising South Africa’s posturing as a ‘gateway’ to the continent, or representing the latter, casts further doubt on its legitimate relative power status in BRICS.5 SOUTH AFRICA’S NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MODE OF GLOBAL IDENTIFICATION A new era signifying a new regional and global role for SA was introduced in its relations with the rest of the world after the regime change of 1994. Because of the impact of profound domestic and international transformations , this new era was characterised by significant changes as well as new patterns in the country’s mode of interaction and identification internationally . The Cold War and the politics it engendered were suddenly rendered passé, as the United States (US) emerged as the world’s only superpower. Contrary to earlier expectations, world politics became less predictable, more complicated, and less peaceful than had been the case during the bipolar cold war era. New tensions of a different kind emerged, affecting the foreign policies of most states. Inevitably, these domestic and international changes necessitated a fundamental redefinition and restructuring of SA’s foreign policy, reflecting the country’s new of identity, its new regional and global orientation and alignment, as well as new foreign policy goals, priorities and strategies. CHAPTER 22 401 SOUTH AFRICA IN BRICS: SUBSTANCE OR PIGGYBACKING? The overbearingly Western-centric foreign policy followed for most of the 20th century by previous governments was replaced after 1994 by a new paradigm. It was based on the country’s much heralded ‘new’ African identity , articulating an ‘African Agenda’, solidarity with the developing world and emerging powers, and it being geographically situated in the ‘Global South’. While the pre-1994...