In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

85 CHAPTER 4 Russia’s Identity Dilemmas: BRICS, the G8 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Alexander Lukin1 INTRODUCTION I mmediately after the collapse of the bipolar system which was the dominant model of international relations during the Cold War, various new global models, as well as sub-regional models, began to form. Eventually, an attempt was made to form a system in which the arbitration as regards to global and major regional problems belonged to a group of developed (predominantly western) states. Within this framework, the ‘G8’ was envisaged as the headquarters for the deliberation and resolution of economic and political issues. The decisions of this body would then be implemented within individual nations through domestic political mechanisms and be codified within international organisations. Russia, China, India and other states were not perceived by the group of developed states as posing an immediate threat (as was the case with the USSR). At the same time, a tough competition on economic and political issues took place. Thus, the aforementioned nation states harshly criticised the Western approach to global politics and adopted the notion of multipolarity as a common platform. As the financial crisis of 2008 unfolded, a relative weakening of the Western bloc, with a simultaneous strengthening of the developing states’ group, became fairly obvious. This tendency actually became apparent even before that - as early as at the turn of the 21st century. After 2008, the leaders of the developing world undertook successful attempts to institutionalise their cooperation by forming the BRICS group. High level ministerial meetings, as well as mid-level conferences, began to occur under the auspices of the BRIC format. A broader group of states established the ‘G20’ which became the centre for harmonisation of the states’ positions on financial issues at the most acute phase of the crisis. An even broader collection of states known as the ‘Group of 77’ has, practically speaking, a 86 CHAPTER 4 limited scope of influence on economic and political issues, but much like ‘BRICS’ and the ‘G20’, the ‘G77’ emphasises reforming the current system of finding solutions to global and regional issues. Under these circumstances, the influence of the ‘G8’ has proportionally declined. According to Russian estimates, the role of the ‘G8’, particularly during the crisis of 2008-2010, is somewhat diminished. Whether that trend will continue is a debatable issue that merits careful consideration and discussion. These developments have posed a variety of difficulties for Russia. In the 1990s and 2000s Russia invested considerable time and effort in order to join the ‘G7’; as a result, the ‘G8’ came into being. However, the ‘G7’ does not include Russia in financial discussions. In talks which include Russia, the ‘G8’ discusses chiefly non-economic issues. As such, although Russia was able to gain membership in the ‘G7’, the group’s agenda significantly changed as a result. The G8 displays interest in Russia acting as an intermediary between the G8 and the ‘BRIC’ countries. At the same time, the ‘G7’ only allows Russia to have limited impact on the overall decisions of the ‘G8’. In resolving financial issues, the ‘G7’ denies Russia access to decision making altogether. It seems that the ‘G8’ wants to have its cake and eat it too by limiting Russia’s influence within the group, but utilising Russia’s external clout to champion the group’s influence throughout the rest of the world. Given this fact, one might expect a period of an active harmonisation of positions within the Group, which, if successful, will end in a consolidation that essentially transforms the ‘G8’ back into the ‘G7’. This scenario is more likely than the possibility that the agenda of the ‘G8’ will once again include financial and economic matters. Russia, in its turn, is restrained by obvious limitations to act from the positions of solidarity with the ‘G8’. Russia is a member of BRICS. And it is that group that the Eight sees as its main competitor. Simultaneously, Russia is still interested in having access to the decision-making discussions within the group of developed states. There is no reason to voluntarily give up such access. As it stands, there are some complex tasks facing Russian diplomacy. In essence, Russia is not interested in the ‘G8’ consolidating its positions and becoming a full-fledged faction in the ‘G20’ and within other international organisations. If this were to happen then a high degree of discipline and solidarity with the Group of 7-8 will be required of Russia, which is...

Share