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65 CHAPTER 3 China and the Indo-Pacific in Beijing’s Strategic Calculus Jian Junbo A s a traditionally land-oriented country, China has not paid much attention to the oceans along its coast until it became deeply involved in the global economic system and the international politics of the post-Cold War era. Now, both the Pacific and Indian Oceans have become significant geographic players that not only influence China’s economic development but also determine the regional stability upon which China’s peaceful development relies. These two oceans are essential for China’s domestic economic and political security. Thus, Beijing has to somehow take the Indo-Pacific into its strategic calculus so as to meet and defend national interests, especially when the international situation is becoming more complex. In this chapter, the dynamics of fledging China’s policy towards the Indo-Pacific will be discussed. It will introduce the structure of this policy from a geopolitical perspective, and analyse the possibility of an integrated Indo-Pacific strategy for China. The implication of China’s Indo-Pacific policy for BRICS will be concluded in the final section, DYNAMICS OF CHINA’S INDO-PACIFIC POLICY The dynamic of Beijing’s policy towards the Indo-Pacific is mainly related to China’s economic development, national security and image in the international community. The sea lanes safety in the Pacific and Indian Oceans is Beijing’s first means of guaranteeing China’s economic security. Its economy is deeply intertwined with global markets, typically with natural resources such as oil, gas and ores that feed its economic development. Furthermore, a great deal of the goods made in China needs the Pacific and Indian Oceans to facilitate economic exchange. 66 CHAPTER 3 Take oil delivery as an example. Since 2009, China has become the second largest oil importer in the world behind the US. This is predicted to increase in the future. Eighty per cent of this oil is from the Middle East and Africa.1 This means that almost half of the oil that China needs is transported through Indo-Pacific waters. As an export-oriented economy, and with the development of Sino-Europe and Sino-Africa trade relations, a large number of goods made in China must be delivered to Europe and Africa through Indo-Pacific waters. Thus, in consideration of the decreasing domestic crude oil reserves and deeper global economic involvement, China will increasingly rely on the SLOCs in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. However, the everlasting ‘Malacca Dilemma’ that Beijing has encountered for a long time is threatening the lines of safety in these waters. Most goods and resources to and from China have to be transported by ships through Malacca, a busy yet dangerous international strait for merchant shipping. The Malacca Strait can also be blocked at any time if the US wants when armed conflicts occur in this region. Yet Beijing also worries about the possible threats posed by neighbouring countries with water or island disputes in the South China Sea, with China predicted to block the strait by force if these countries use this as a lever to press China to make territorial concessions. Clearly, how to resolve the ‘Malacca Dilemma,’ the vulnerability of SLOCs in this region and China’s high reliability on Malacca are key dynamics in Beijing’s emerging Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet apart from this, to maintain regional stability while realising China’s peaceful development as well as to balance US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing must have a strong interest in these waters. From the 1990s, China’s government argued that its rise would definitely be realised peacefully, a different ascension from those of the old powers such as Britain or the US. According to the concept of ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’, non-violence, non-interference by force, non-aggression and a non-armed offensive should be the core parts of grand strategy.2 Obviously, keeping the Indo-Pacific stable is intrinsic in this strategy. This is also a principle of China’s diplomatic policy toward its neighbours, the ‘Good Neighbour Policy’, formally proposed by Beijing in 2003. In consideration of the reality, not the ideology, of Beijing’s peaceful development and politics, the idea of the ‘Harmonious World’ is at the forefront . China needs a stable yet peaceful regional situation, and this includes the Indo-Pacific. Any conflict near China’s border in the Indo-Pacific region or between China and its neighbour(s) will undermine, damage, change or...

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