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PART 1 Treaties and Agreements 67 The Nile River and the riparian states CHAPTER 4 Ethiopia’s position on the Nile water agreements Tesfaye Tafesse 4.1 Introduction By virtue of the three major tributaries of the Nile River systems, namely the Blue Nile, Atbara and Sobat, Ethiopia contributes 86 per cent of the total volume of water to the Nile, with the White Nile contributing the remaining ŗŚȱ™Ž›ȱŒŽ—ǯȱ‘’˜™’ŠȂœȱŒ˜—›’‹ž’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ’•Žȱ̘ ǰȱ‘˜ ŽŸŽ›ǰȱ›’œŽœȱ˜ȱşśȱ™Ž›ȱ cent during the summer season heavy rains from July to September. For historical and geographical reasons, not all the Nile Basin’s riparian states have been in a position to utilise the waters of the Nile equally. Egypt has always been the most extensive user of the Nile waters, followed by Sudan. Ironically, Ethiopia, which contributes about 86 per cent of the waters of the Nile, utilises less than 1 per cent. In reality, Ethiopia’s hydraulic works in the Nile Basin are very limited in scope when weighed against their potential, both in terms of irrigation and hydropower generation. Given the locations of Ethiopia and Egypt at the producing and receiving ends, respectively, of the course of the Nile, and owing to Egypt’s total dependence upon the river, fear, suspicion and anxiety among Egyptians of what may occur upstream in Ethiopia have been more the norm than the exception since the dawn of history. It is this predominantly acrimonious interstate relationship between the two countries that has shaped and continues to shape the hydropolitics of the Nile Basin. The wider claim that ‘’˜™’ŠȱŒ˜ž•ȱŒ˜—›˜•ȱ‘Žȱ̘ ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ’•ŽȱŠ—ȱœŠ›ŸŽȱ‘Žȱ™Ž˜™•Žȱ˜ȱ¢™ȱ to death was an all too common issue in the medieval and post-medieval periods. As shown in the next sections, with the intent to avert their real and/˜›ȱ’–Š’—ŽȱŽŠ›œǰȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜•˜—’Š•ȱ™˜ Ž›œȱŠ—ȱ¢™ȱ•ŽĞȱ—˜ȱœ˜—Žȱž—ž›—Žȱ˜ȱ strike a deal with independent Ethiopia and the then colonised Nile riparian states (through their colonial masters) in order to secure the full control of the Nile. ‘’œȱŒ‘Š™Ž›ȱꛜȱŠ’–œȱ˜ȱŠ™™›Š’œŽȱ‘Žȱ™›ŽŸ’˜žœȱ’•Žȱ ŠŽ›ȱŠ›ŽŽ–Ž—œǯȱ —ȱ so doing, it discusses the essence of the agreements, the situations and contexts in which they were signed and their relevance and/or irrelevance to the Nile upstream states, most particularly to Ethiopia. Following that, the various Ethiopiangovernments’positionsonthepreviousagreementsarediscussed.In addition, the study reviews the ongoing Cooperative Framework Agreement 68 Ethiopia’s position on the Nile water agreements Africa Institute of South Africa PART 1 Treaties and Agreements (CFA) in the basin. The chapter concludes its discussion by assessing theŒž››Ž—ȱœŠŽȱ˜ȱŠěŠ’›œǰȱ’—’ŒŠ’—ȱžž›Žȱ’›ŽŒ’˜—œȱŠ—ȱœžŽœ’—ȱœŒŽ—Š›’˜œǯ 4.2 Appraisal of Nile Water Agreements To begin with, there is no multilateral and comprehensive agreement›ŽŠ›’—ȱ‘ŽȱžœŽȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ ŠŽ›œȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ’•Žȱ˜›ȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜––˜—ȱ‹Ž—Žęȱ˜ȱŠ••ȱ‘Žȱ nations of the basin.At best, what can be said of the Nile is that there have been bilateral agreements that have remained as partial rather than comprehensive›ŽŠ’ŽœǯȱœȱœŠŽȱ‹¢ȱ ž•’—ǰȱȁǯǯǯȱ’—ȱŠȱœ’žŠ’˜—ȱ•’”Žȱ‘’œȱǽŠ‹œŽ—ŒŽȱ˜ȱŠ›ŽŽ–Ž—Ǿǰȱ all national development plans made by one government concerning the use of the Nile will be perceived by another government as a threat to its national’—Ž›ŽœœȱŠ—ȱ‘žœȱŠȱœ˜ž›ŒŽȱ˜ȱ’—Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱŒ˜—Ě’ŒȂǯ1 The relevant parts of the previous Nile water agreements are appraised in the following sections. 4.2.1 Rome, 15 April 1891 ‘’œȱ›ŽŠ¢ȱ Šœȱ–ŠŽȱŠ•˜—œ’Žȱ‘ŽȱŽ–Š›ŒŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ›Žœ™ŽŒ’ŸŽȱ’—ĚžŽ—ŒŽȱ˜ȱ Britain and Italy in East Africa from Ras Kassar in the north (the northern tip of present-day Eritrea) to the Blue Nile Basin in the south. Britain urged Italy and/or Ethiopia to strike a deal or make a treaty with regard to the utilisation of the Atbara River. Italy acceded to British demands and agreed to sign an article (Article III, No. 136) referring to the river. It read as follows: ‘... the Italian government undertakes not to construct on the Atbara any works‘’Œ‘ȱ–’‘ȱœŽ—œ’‹•¢ȱ–˜’¢ȱ’œȱ̘ ȱ’—˜ȱ‘Žȱ’•ŽȂǯ2 At the time of this pact, the Italians had already established themselves in Eritrea, but not in Ethiopia. The vague phrase ‘sensibly modify’ limits neither the utilisation of the river nor the fair share of the Nile waters. Had the treaty even excluded the usage of the Nile water by Ethiopia, which was not the case then as it is now, it should‘ŠŸŽȱŒŽŠœŽȱ˜ȱ‘ŠŸŽȱŠ—¢ȱ›Ž•ŽŸŠ—ŒŽȱŠĞŽ›ȱ‘ŽȱŽ–’œŽȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ›’’œ‘ȱŠ—ȱ Š•’Š—ȱŒ˜•˜—’Š•ȱ ›ž•Žœȱ ’—ȱ ‘Žȱ ›Ž’˜—ǯȱ ‘’œȱ ›ŽŠ¢ǰȱ ‘˜ ŽŸŽ›ǰȱ Ž¡Ž–™•’ꮍȱ ‘Žȱ ›’’œ‘ȱ motive of safeguarding Egyptian interests from as early as this period. 4.2.2 Addis Ababa, 15 May 1902 At this time, Great Britain sent its special envoy, Lt Colonel John Lane Harrington, to Addis Ababa to negotiate outstanding frontier issues between Ethiopia and the neighbouring British colonies. Article III of the resultant agreement between the two countries, with Britain acting for Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, dealt with the future utilisation of the waters of the Nile. The treaty reads as follows: His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself toward the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed any works across the Blue Nile...

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