South African Foreign Policy Review: Volume 1

CHAPTER 2. Opening the ‘black box’: South African foreign policy-making

20 CHAPTER 2 Opening the ‘black box’ SouthAfricanforeignpolicy-making1 Lesley Masters INTRODUCTION T he question of who shapes a country’s foreign policy is often posed, and it is a particularly salient one in the South African context, as the country moved from isolation to integration on the world stage. This chapter considers the role of agency, or ‘who’ plays a key role in shaping South African foreign policy decision-making in the post-1994 period. Early analyses highlighted the central role of the president in giving shape and direction to the ‘new’ South Africa’s foreign policy. In particular, the role of President Nelson Mandela and his successor Thabo Mbeki, fulfilling the position of international statesmen, underpinned the idea of the president as the locus of foreign policy. Reality is, however, more complex. Identifying ‘who’ shapes foreign policy decision-making, or prying open the so-called ‘black box’, is an extraordinarily complex process and one which highlights the numerous interlinkages between those seeking to influence foreign policy decision-making. A review of developments in South Africa post-1994 demonstrates that the foreign policy process, including the actors that seek to influence decision-making, is in a constant state of flux. Rather than focusing on the ridged concentric circles of decision-making set out in foreign policy analysis, this chapter highlights the roles of myriad actors and their diverse interests in shaping the country’s foreign policy approach. THE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF DECISION-MAKING The field of foreign policy analysis identifies multiple levels of players seeking a role in shaping foreign policy decision-making. At the centre is the political leader and key officials, while radiating outwards are the lower-level 21 OPENING THE ‘BLACK BOX’ officials followed by the media, nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and the public who occupy positions in the outer circles.2 In the South African context what is immediately apparent is the central role assumed by the president – both historically during the apartheid era and over the course of the first decade and a half of the ‘new’ democratic South Africa. Yet this focus on the executive obscures the role of other foreign policy stakeholders as they move between the centre and the periphery in their efforts to inform foreign policy decision-making.3 In other words, the position of these stakeholders within these concentric circles does not remain static. From the South African experience it is clear that, while some may be located on the periphery, they have the potential to move towards the centre of the decision-making process, and even to supplant those traditionally occupying a prominent position, as a result of their financial resources, their expertise, and whether there is a particular interest at stake. AT THE CENTRE: FROM MANDELA TO ZUMA The executive continues to play a central role in international relations, a point sharpened by the burgeoning popularity of summit diplomacy. South Africa is no exception. Since 1994, South Africa’s presidents have continued , to varying degrees, to occupy the central position in the foreign policy machinery. This has seen arguments that during Mandela’s incumbency foreign policy followed the president’s public statements ‘rather than the other way round’.4 Thabo Mbeki frequently came under fire, with reference to an ‘imperial presidency’, for his centralised position in foreign policy.5 What is not often considered is that this position, at the centre of the foreign policy decision-making process, is supported by an enabling framework within which a predominant president can exist. This includes not only the president’s personal interest in international affairs, but also a historical tradition of a strong presidency in South Africa, the nature of the African National Congress (ANC) as a liberation movement, the country’s Constitution, and the capacity of the country’s foreign policy bureaucracy, as well as wider international dynamics. In the first instance, both Mandela and Mbeki demonstrated a natural predisposition towards international relations. Mandela’s international status saw him overshadow other foreign policy stakeholders, blurring the lines between the individual, the ruling political party and the state. Discussions surrounding Pretoria’s approach to international relations were linked to Mandela’s presidential visions and initiatives, focusing on the values of democracy, respect for international law and the protection of human rights.6 In practice, Mandela faced criticism for his predominant position, 22 CHAPTER 2 despite input from advisers and discussions in Parliament, on decisions relating to Nigeria following...