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9 Crisis and Legitimacy The Knesset's overwhelming approval of the Camp David agreements authorized the Israeli government to undertake talks with Egypt and the United States aimed at reaching a peace treaty. However, the ambiguities in the Camp David accords that surfaced soon after the conference, together with both sides' acknowledgment that they had made commitments that would not be easy to implement, led Egypt and Israel to request modifications in the existing texts. These requests opened a new phase of deliberations and negotiations that lasted almost six months. The Knesset's decisive support for the Camp David agreements did not minimize the fact that most of the MKs who voted against the agreements or abstained came from Menachem Begin's own party and from the National Religious Party, its closest coalition partner. Begin failed to persuade many of his closest associates that the Camp David agreements were consistent with his basic national values and that he had the knowledge and competence to carry out the agreements without endangering Israel's interests. As the domestic criticism of the accounts mounted, Begin tended in public statements to downplay the Israeli concessions regarding the Palestinians. He insisted on a very narrow definition of self-government for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza while emphasizing that Israel would not withdraw from the West Bank; he also announced plans to expand the settlements there. These statements, however, were interpreted by Egypt and the United States as a deviation from Israel's undertaking at Camp David, and as indicating Begin's interest in implementing a separate agreement with Egypt while retaining Israel's control in the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt, for its part, faced massive Arab criticism for signing the Camp David agreements and found itself in a very delicate situation. The only way to legitimize the agreements was by emphasizing the linkage between their two parts. Egypt's demand for changes in the texts of the accords that would stress the linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the West Bank and Gaza agreement, and the priority of Egypt's agreements with Arab states over the Camp David accords as a whole, clashed with Begin's attempts to avoid such linkage and made his task of legitimization still harder. Thus Begin be- 156 Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 came more determined to oppose any new Egyptian demands for changes that would be interpreted as asking for more concessions from Israel. The new deliberations with Egypt and the United States on the wording of the peace treaty not only deflated the euphoria following the conclusion of the accords but triggered doubts among the Israeli ministers. Some began to feel that the costs and risks of the agreements exceeded the benefits and opportunities . When the government itself became disenchanted with the agreements , it became even more difficult to legitimize them to the public. This chapter analyzes the change in Israeli perceptions of the Camp David agreements, and in the means of obtaining legitimacy, arising from increased criticism of the agreements by Begin's closest allies and from Egypt's demands for alterations. Initial Expectations Immediately after the Knesset's approval ofthe Camp David agreements, the general perception of the Israeli leadership, and especially of Begin, Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, was that it would be possible to reach a peace treaty with Egypt within a short time, two or three months. No serious obstacles were anticipated; indeed, initial arrangements were made to implement the expected peace treaty. A steering committee was established in the Ministry of Agriculture to deal with the evacuation of the Sinai settlers and the establishment of new settlements for them in the Negev. The settlers were asked to cooperate with the government in everything connected with their evacuation. In addition, Begin appointed an interministerial committee to prepare Israel's proposals for the negotiations on Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; the committee was headed by the director general of the Prime Minister's Office, Eliyahu Ben-Elisar.' Furthermore, the government authorized the Israeli delegation, headed by Dayan, to handle the upcoming peace negotiations with Egypt and the United States. The government, however, which was now less happy overall with the way the negotiations had gone since Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and especially at Camp David, refused to authorize the delegation to finalize any agreement with Egypt and the United States; a draft of any such agreement would have to be brought to the government for discussion.' Demands...

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