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8 Legitimacy for the Camp David Agreements Menachem Begin's signing of the Camp David accords on September 17, 1978, forced him to face, for the first time since the beginning of the peace process, his peace policy's serious problems of legitimacy. The accords constituted a serious deviation from not only Begin's own peace plan as he presented it in December 1977 but also his commitments to the Sinai settlers. On the eve of his departure for Camp David, Begin had met with the settlers of the Yamit Zone and had given his pledge that he would never agree to dismantle the settlements; if confronted at Camp David with a demand that Israel do so, he would "pack his begs and go back home.'" Now, Begin had confronted his party, the cabinet the Knesset, and the public with a fait accompli. He had concluded an agreement that no one had expected, including himself, before attending the Camp David conference. Although Begin and his negotiating team, especially Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, realized that they would face sharp criticism, they were certain that ultimately the cabinet and especially the Knesset would approve the agreements . The major problem was how to present and justify the concessions made at Camp David, especially the removal of the settlements. This chapter analyzes Begin's efforts to obtain legitimacy for the Camp David accords, the techniques he employed, and the emergence of extraparliamentary opposition to the accords. Seeking Legitimacy: The Informal Process Informal efforts to obtain legitimacy for the Camp David accords began immediately after the accords were signed. Begin, in several public declarations and interviews, tried to gain support for the agreements, resorting to various tactics that sometimes involved the use of normative and cognitive arguments . The most important of these tactics were: transferring responsibility for removal of the settlements to the Knesset; proposing two votes, one on the agreements and one on removal of the settlements; suggesting a free vote without party discipline; presenting the agreements as the best that Israel could achieve under the circumstances; and claiming that there was no difference be- 138 Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 tween Israel's peace plan and the Camp David accords and that there had been no withdrawal from basic principles and ideology. The most problematic tactic, initially an idea of President Carter's that had won the support of Begin, Dayan, and Weizman at Camp David, was that of submitting responsibility for evacuation of the settlements to the Knesset. The rationale for that idea was that the government did not have the authority to dismantle the settlements-that is, such a policy would go against the government 's decision to build them in the first place, which had been approved by the Knesset-therefore only the Knesset had the authority to do so. It was in addition to this idea that Begin suggested separate votes, one on the accords and one on removing the settlements, as well as having a free vote. Begin even considered the possibility of not participating in the Knesset debate, because it was important to him that the "Knesset really decide in a totally free manner.'" Although Begin probably regarded the idea of turning to the Knesset as a reasonable solution to his personal distress about betraying the Sinai settlers, this solution had two major problems. First, it was perceived by the major opposition party, the Alignment, as well as by some of the Likud cabinet members and MKs, as an attempt by Begin to evade responsibility. The accusation against Begin was that while he wanted to be known as the leader who had achieved the peace treaty, he was leaving to the Knesset the "dirty work" ofremoving the settlements. They called on Begin to show leadership and to express explicitly his position on the issue during the debate at the Knesset. Second, the idea of separate votes was perceived to be illogical: the two issues were interconnected and could not be artificially disjoined. There was no way to approve the agreements as a whole and simultaneously negate one of their major clauses without foiling the agreements. Such an attempt would be interpreted as a rejection of the Camp David accords and again the Knesseti .e., Israel-would be regarded as responsible for scuttling the chances for peace.' Begin seemed to recognize the irony of the idea of separate votes, but adhered to it as a way of escaping the value-complexity situation that he faced...

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