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7 The Camp David Conference All that the Israeli delegation to the Camp David conference expected to occur there was the forging of a way to ensure the continuation of the negotiations , which would take place several months after the conference. They did not expect that Israel would have to make crucial decisions involving changes in the original peace plan it had presented to Presidents Carter and Sadat. What the Israeli delegation, especially Menachem Begin, faced at Camp David was the most severe value-complexity situation since the beginning of the peace process-one that forced Begin to deviate not only from his own peace plan but from his basic political beliefs. These changes also created difficult legitimacy problems for him. This chapter examines the reasons for the changes in the Israeli positions that enabled the conclusion of the Camp David accords; evaluates these changes in relation to Begin's beliefs and his own peace plan; and discusses Begin's rationale for the changes, and his attempt to legitimize them. The Problem of Changing Positions The Camp David summit was called by Moshe Dayan "the decisive, most difficult and least pleasant stage of the Egypt-Israel peace negotiations," mainly because Israel had "to resolve agonizing psychological and ideological crises" in order to achieve an agreement. This meant "abandoning long-held traditional viewpoints ... and taking up new positions.'" At Camp David, the Israeli delegation was asked: to accept the dismantling of the Israeli settlements in the Sinai and to evacuate the airfields there; to accept the applicability of Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza; to accept the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, language used in Resolution 242; and to change its autonomy plan. The Israeli team, particularly Begin, made a supreme effort to prevent basic changes in traditional Israeli positions while not endangering the prospects of an agreement. The major problem was that the Israeli team was confronted with a U.S.-Egyptian common position that made the potential costs of not conceding extremely high: not only the endan- 116 Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 gering of the prospects of reaching an agreement with Egypt, but also the aggravating of the relationship with the United States. Begin arrived at Camp David without any new ideas or proposals about solving the controversial issues in the negotiations. Only in his first meeting with Carter on September 5, the first day of the conference, did he realize that he had to address these issues and make crucial decisions. Begin's suggestion of reaching an agreement at Camp David only on "general principles" was strongly rejected by Carter.' Begin realized that Carter was determined to make peace between Israel and Egypt-now, at Camp David; that Sadat was introducing a very tough position; and that the United States was tending toward this Egyptian position. Begin, according to Weizman, "was not showing any particular sign of concern" after the first meeting with Carter.' However, his report made his colleagues apprehensive. They realized that the wide differences between the parties would make it difficult, if not impossible, to salvage the peace process." That night, following Begin's report, the Israeli team did not discuss the possibility of changing the traditional Israeli positions or making new proposals . Nevertheless, Dayan suggested a procedural means to avoid an immediate crisis in the negotiations: namely, to begin by summarizing the points already agreed upon, leaving the controversial issues for the end of the conference, on the assumption that it would be easier to compromise at that point. Weizman was not convinced; he believed the delegation would either have to make a tremendous adjustment or leave the conference soon.' The next day, before the first joint meeting between Carter, Begin, and Sadat, Begin called a new consultation. Now, as Weizman recalled, the "tension was evident" in Begin. Again, no new proposals were put forward; the discussion focused on Dayan's suggestion of channeling the discussion among the three leaders to the issue of the Sinai, while leaving the issue of settlements until the end of the conference. An agreement on the Sinai, Dayan explained, would reduce Egyptian motivation for foiling the conference. Weizman disagreed and called for discussing Judea and Samaria first, because the future of the peace process would be determined by the fate of these two areas since resolving their fate was the toughest problem. The consultation ended inconclusively . No clear-cut decision was made as to the Israeli approach...

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