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6 Reevaluation and Negative Legitimacy The failure of the Ismailia summit dampened Israeli hopes for concluding an immediate peace agreement with Egypt on the basis of the Israeli peace plan. The summit highlighted the gap between the two sides' positions: Sadat had offered Israel a full peace treaty only in return for total withdrawal from the territories and endorsing the Palestinians' right to statehood; in other words, Israel had to choose between territories and peace.' This position was no different from the one Sadat had presented to the Knesset, but the Israel negotiating team at Ismailia had expected a change. Begin had been certain that his peace plan represented the end of the negotiating process; now he found that at best it could serve only as a beginning. The Ismailia summit, therefore, marked a turning point. The Israeli leadership was awakened from its peace euphoria; instincts of mistrust that had lain dormant during the weeks of exhilaration reawoke, and members of the cabinet now expressed skepticism about the worth of a peace treaty under the new conditions.' From lanuary to September 1978, the Israeli leadership's doubts about the peace process would be intensified by the following factors: (1) Egypt's rejection of the Israeli peace plan; (2) an anti-Israel campaign in the Egyptian press; (3) the abrupt and indefinite suspension of the Political Committee by Sadat a day after its convention in lerusalem on lanuary 17, 1978; (4) U.S.Egyptian cooperation that was perceived as aimed at pressuring Israel to make greater concessions; and (5) Sadat's refusal to renew the direct negotiations with Begin, and his meeting instead only with Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, which Begin, Moshe Dayan, and others in the cabinet interpreted as an attempt to crack the cabinet's unified position. Concerns that Israel would be blamed for the failure of the peace process, especially in the light of U.S. identification with the Egyptian position in the negotiations, impelled the Israeli leadership to look for negative legitimacy: that is, to rationalize and justify its position while attributing blame for the failure of the negotiations to Egypt. The regression of the peace process did not bring a change in the Israeli peace plan; the general perception was that Israel had arrived at the limit of its concessions and even had to enhance its position 86 Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 by taking operative actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Weizman, however , rejected this approach and called for consideration of other concessions so as not to miss the opportunity for peace. This would lead to a conflict within the Israeli cabinet that would harm Israel's bargaining position. Because of the deterioration of the peace process, the need for domestic legitimacy became less vital. The initial domestic critics of the peace plan now hoped that under the new circumstances the plan would become irrelevant, and they scaled down their activism. However, criticism of the government's handling of the negotiating process increased. Indeed, a new Israeli protest group was established-the Peace Now movement, which sought to pressure the government to take more flexible positions in order to achieve peace with Egypt. This chapter will analyze the change in Israeli perceptions caused by the new developments in the peace process, the need for reevalution of the peace process, the decline in the need to obtain a domestic legitimacy for the peace plan coupled with the growing need to acquire negative legitimacy in case of failure of the peace process, as well as the domestic pressures extended by the opposition forces, mainly the Alignment and Peace Now. No Need for Change As noted, the failure of the Ismailia talks did not cause the Israeli leadership to reevaluate its peace plan, which was still seen as fair and just. At the Herut.Party meeting on Janury 8, 1978, Begin even maintained that since Egypt did not accept Israel's peace plan, Israel according to international law was entitled to declare that its proposal was null and void.' Nevertheless, there was some hope that the future deliberations of the political and military committees scheduled to be convened in Jerusalem and Cairo that month would enable continuation of the negotiations; yet there was also concern that the Egyptians would try to bring U.S. presure to bear in Israel to change its position, especially regarding the West Bank. But concern over the future of the peace process as well as pressure on Israel to...

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