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4 Sadat's Visit to Israel Anwar el-Sadat's visit to Israel from November 19 to 21,1977, opened a new era in the Middle East and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It indicated a dramatic and significant change in Egypt's foreign policy toward Israel. Suddenly, a shift from protracted hostility to a peaceful relationship between Egypt and Israel became conceivable. With his visit to Israel, Sadat was able to put the ball in Israel's court; the success of his initiative depended on Israel's reaction. Sadat's visit created a great opportunity but also a serious problem for Israeli decisionmakers, an unprecedented situation of great complexity. Israel could not ignore the fact that a significant change had occurred in its external environment, one that seemed to require reconsideration of its basic perceptions about the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as its concepts of peace; yet the situation seemed fraught with danger and uncertainty. Israel, essentially, was being asked to make crucial decisions of a kind it had never before confronted. This chapter examines: (I) the Israeli evaluation of Sadat' s initiative as a significant change in its external environment; (2) the Israeli perception of Sadat's initiative as both an opportunity and a problem; and (3) the initial attempts to adapt Israeli policy to the new situation. Before dealing with these issues , it would be useful to look at Israel's basic perceptions of conflict and peace in the Middle East so as to assess to what extent they changed following Sadat's initiative. Israel's Basic Perceptions of Conflict and Peace Israel had never truly experienced peace. It had experienced only conflict , violence, and sometimes full-scale war. The common Israeli perception was that the Arab-Israeli conflict was insoluble for the following reasons: it was based on uncompromisable interests; it was essentially "zero-sum"; it constituted a "natural state of affairs.'" Despite these perceptions, peace was and remains a central aspiration both of Israeli society and of Israel's foreign policy. Baruch Kimmerling distinguishes among five perceptions concerning the issue of peace that were uni- 50 Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 versal before the Sadat initiative: (I) peace with all Arab states is a national objective and lofty ideal of Israeli society; (2) the Arabs are unwilling to accept the existence of Israel in the region and therefore seek to destroy it; (3) Israel, therefore, cannot resolve the conflict and the achievement of peace thus does not depend on Israel; (4) peace will indeed arrive someday because of modernization processes in the Arab world and perhaps because Arabs will eventually realize that annihilating Israel is impossible, that the conflict only exacts great cost, and therefore coexistence with Israel is more worthwhile; (5) although peace is a desired objective, security has a greater value than any other objective including peace.' That is, concessions made for peace must be measured against their contributions to security: "If peace lowers the level of security , then it is not worthwhile. Peace may only be agreed to and strived for if it neither diminishes nor endangers security.'" These perceptions underwent their first partial modification in response to the Six Day War, and particularly Israel's gaining control of the Sinai Peninsula , the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Many Israelis then felt that the Arabs, in light of military defeat and losses of territory, would be forced to recognize both that they could not destroy Israel militarily and that they now had an incentive to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel. In order to launch negotiations with the Arab states, Israel's National Unity Government adopted, on June 19, 1967, a dramatic resolution stating that it would be prepared to withdraw to the international borders with Egypt and Syria in exchange for a peace treaty and establishment of diplomatic relations. The Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights would have to be demilitarized and appropriate measures taken to guarantee Israel's security and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal. The future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as the problem of the Palestinian refugees, would be subject to separate negotiations. Israel would not withdraw from any occupied territories until the conclusion of a peace agreement. The content of this resolution was communicated to Washington on June 22. Several days later, Egypt and Syria vehemently rejected the proposal, insisting instead on an unconditional Israeli withdrawal.4 That...

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