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1 Peace and Legitimacy Significant change in the foreign policy arena of a given state is likely to be generated by crisis or war, which are generally radical and sudden situations that involve the highest of stakes and the very essence of a state's national interest. I will maintain that significant change in foreign policy may also be induced by the reduction and termination of a conflict, and especially by the initiation of a peace plan or by a positive response to a peace initiative on the part of the adversary. Peace initiatives and peace agreements constitute a drastic and often sudden breakpoint in pattern behavior along the peace-war continuum of a state's relations with any other actor(s) when: the stakes are the highest, most central to basic values and interests, and have the potential to spill over into the widest range of associated areas. This argument is especially appropriate to protracted conflicts, and "do not allow for any change in the fundamental grievances and continuously act to reduce the chances for any resolution of the issues ." Because peace would so profoundly change the nature of interstate relations in situations of protracted conflict, "peace in this situation would constitute a breakpoint.'" The initiating of a peace proposal by one side and a positive response to it by the other side can constitute a significant change in foreign policy. However , a peace proposal that is not reciprocated positively by the adversary will not necessarily result in the expected change in the foreign policy of the initiator if it is compelled to relinquish its proposal. However, rejecting conciliation when it is supported by domestic demand not only disrupts the prospects of making peace but also may undermine political stability. The initiating of a peace proposal may occur for the following reasons: (I) conflictual foreign policy does not achieve the desired aims, and decisionmakers believe that by shifting from war to peace they could attain these aims; (2) continuation of conflict relations becomes too costly in terms of human and nonhuman resources, and therefore peace appears to be more rewarding than war; (3) peace is perceived to bring direct and indirect benefits (political, economic , or military); (4) leadership's compliance with external or domestic pressures to peaceful change in foreign policy. The external pressures are constraints 2 Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 or inducements exerted by other states; domestic pressures are demands that come from people in the ruling elite, or from competing elites, interest groups, or the unorganized public. Peace as a Problem for Decisionmakers The shift from war to peace is often difficult for policymakers to contemplate or carry out, even when they favor such a course of action. This is particularly true in the case of protracted conflict. In this situation, continuing with a familiar state of hostility is easier than dealing with the unknown: "continuing a state of hostility can offer what looks like escape from a painful process of change.'" A shift from war to peace poses potential problems for decisionmakers. These involve not only recognition and interpretation of a new situation but also reassessment of basic attitudes and values, as well as issues of legitimacy and consensus building. When the adversary in such a conflict signals a desire to move toward peace, the question will arise as to whether his proposal of peace is sincere. Decisionmakers in a protracted conflict tend to perceive the behavior of their enemy in a manner consistent with their basic attitudes: the enemy is expected to be hostile. The truth or relevance of information not consistent with this basic belief tends to be ignored, reinterpreted, or questioned. In a similar way, information about the enemy that supports or reinforces earlier and fixed beliefs and expectations is most readily accepted and acted on.' "When the other party is viewed within the framework of an 'inherent bad faith' model, the image of the enemy is clearly self-perpetuating, for the model itself denies the existence of data which could invalidate it."ยท Such cognitive dynamics lead decisionmakers to dismiss conciliatory moves by the enemy.' The strong feelings of mutual distrust in a protracted conflict may bring the decisionmakers to regard any openness by the enemy as deception, as a tactic designed to give the enemy an advantage. Since any attempt by the enemy to act in a conciliatory manner is inconsistent with a definition of the enemy as evil, decisionmakers have to change their attitudes and beliefs about the...

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