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CHAPTER ELEVEN From Lebanon to the Intifada Prime Minister Shimon Peres seemed not to be interested in foreign affairs as a top priority, but rather in economic problems and in the endless Lebanon war, which became a major domestic source of concern . However, in May 1985, under Peres as prime minister and Shamir as his senior deputy and foreign minister, the usually well-informed Aerospace Daily reported that Israel had deployed a large number ofJericho missiles in the Negev and in the Golan Heights, as discussed in the previous chapter.1 The deployment of the 400-mile Jericho system was confirmed in Spector's 1990 book.2 If these reports were true, the stage had been reached when a mass deployment of at least short-medium range, homemade missiles was possible and agreeable to both coalition partners, despite their political differences. The ensuing testing of Jericho "follow-ups," which according to foreign sources took place later in the 1980s, must have also been the result of an agreement between Likud and Labor.3 The difference between Likud and Labor may be sought in terms of Peres' use of opaque, but more and more visible , nuclear options as a tool to promote a political process entailing some territorial concessions. One could learn here from Helmut Schmidt's 1979 "double track decision" to deploy modern "theater nuclear weapons" in Germany and negotiate with the Soviets at the same time.' However, once again most Israelis were unable to follow this line of thought, even after the publicity given to the alleged missile deployment and missile testing. Moreover, in Israel's case no American ICBMs or submarine-fired missiles were part of the superstructure of such a "double track decision," as they were in the German case. We can thereby explain foreign 197 198 The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East sources' claims that Israeli-made IRBMs, possibly ICBMs, were added to the shorter-range "theater weapons" mentioned above. By now they could be interpreted as a tool to encourage the Soviets to enter the peace process. We do not know whether Peres perceived in such weapons a trump card that could be fully or partially traded off when Moscow responded positively, because the game was played by implication. When Mordechai Vanunu, the nuclear technician employed at Dimona, was fired and got himself into spiritual and financial trouble, he published information in which he tried to stress that Israel was doing illegal things in the most sensitive sphere of international affairs, instead of making peace. Yet the impact of Vanunu's disclosures on the Arab world, at least as far as its press and official statements were concerned, could be seen as divided: Arab radicals such as Qaddafi, and those in Egyptian opposition circles, reacted with anger and dismay , doubling their demands for an Arab bomb. Others, such as Iraq and Syria, responded by invoking chemical weapons as an interim solution until they got their own bombs. Whereas Egypt repeatedly argued that chemical weapons, mounted on missiles, were enough as a counterthreat , due to Israel's known sensitivity to any meaningful losses, especially among civilians. Of course, such a threat was not enough to cover an Arab war of destruction against Israel. But it could cover limited wars, and Arab efforts to produce their own bomb. On the other hand, the Syrian press used Vanunu's revelations, the missile disclosures, and Israel's refusal to join the NPT to portray Israel as a "pirate" state.5 And it tried to transmit these Israeli threats to the Soviet Union, inferring that the Israeli program was relevant to EastWest rivalry, because (as Arabs saw it) the United States was interested in Israeli nuclear threats vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This argument, aimed at getting the Soviets more involved on the Arab side, could, of course, make them become less involved, especially after Gorbachev's takeover. It could make the Soviets seek some kind of a conflict resolution , and not a "strategic balance." The Syrians-and the Iraqis-had been talking about such a balance since 1973, arguing that they were confronted with the Israeli nuclear option in its various opaque patterns . Like many others, the Syrians failed at first to comprehend the deep changes in the Soviet Union, which were soon to be manifested by an entirely new and unknown quantity, Mikhail Gorbachev, and which were only partially related to foreign and defense issues and the enormous costs of a futile...

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