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13. On Opposite Sides of the Hill: Syrian and Israeli Perspectives Eyal Zisser This essay analyzes Israeli and Syrian mutual perceptions and policy-making in the context of Syria's failed quest to achieve "strategic parity" with Israel and the new regional realities following the collapse ofthe former Soviet Union. The author highlights each party's continued perception of the other as a hostile enemy bent on regional hegemony and exposes a gap between the parties that is still deep despite the current adoption ofthe "peace process" as the strategic option ofchoice by both countries. al-'Abdallah, Hamidi, Asad's Strategy, A Comparative Study of Strategic Parity between Syria and Israel, Beirut: Sharikat al-Haqiqa lil-Sahafa wal-I'lam, 1995. (Arabic) Hafiz, 'Adil, Hafiz al-Asad: a Leader and a Nation, Damascus: al-Markaz alDawli lil-Nashr wal-I'lam, 1993. (Arabic) Ma'oz, Moshe, Israel and Syria: End of the Conflict?!, Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1996. (Hebrew) Yaniv, Avner, Moshe Ma'oz, and Avi Kober, eds., Syria and Israel's National Security, Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1990. (Hebrew) 241 242 Eyal Zisser Introduction Clhe year 1996 will be remembered in the annals of Israel's his1 tory, and those of the Arab world surrounding it, as a year of upheaval. First and foremost it saw not only a dramatic political turnaround in Israel, but also, and possibly to no small measure as a result of this, a reversal of the course of history in the entire region . In the early part ofthe year there were expectations ofa breakthrough in the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria. These expectations were based on media reports, as well as on expressions ofoptimism by official spokespersons and even leaders on both sides. An example of this was a declaration published in January 1996 in the official Syrian organ Tishrin: "Next year will be a year ofpeace.'>l Only a month previously Tishrin had granted the then-prime minister ofIsrael, Shimon Peres, the title of"man ofpeace.,,2 These expectations, however, never materialized. The peace process soon after reached an impasse, and toward the end of 1996 relations between the two countries had deteriorated to the brink of a possible outbreak ofhostilities.3 The election ofa new government in Israel ostensibly caused this downward spiral in Israeli-Syrian relations. Instead of the far-reaching readiness on the part of the Labor government, initially led by the late Yitzhak Rabin and subsequently by Shimon Peres, for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the new Likud government under Benjamin Netanyahu adopted a stand stating Israel's intention to retain the Golan Heights, even within the framework of a peace agreement. The Syrians were quick to declare that they would not negotiate with Israel until the Likud government announced its commitment to the agreement they claimed to have reached with the Labor government , according to which Israel would withdraw completely from the Heights to the 4 June 1967 borders. The Syrians even threatened that, should the new government not accede to this demand , they would consider other options at their disposal, including the military option.4 But the roots of the difficulties that have plagued the peace process on the Syrian-Israeli track are far deeper than the mere change of government in Israel. This is borne out in 'Adil Hafiz's book, Hafiz al-Asad: A Leader and a Nation. The book was published in 1993, during the peace talks between Syria and the Labor government under Yitzhak Rabin. Totally ignoring the progress that had been made in those negotiations at that time, Hafiz clearly ex- On Opposite Sides ofthe Hill 243 pressed Damascus' traditional attitude toward Israel, which attached no importance to the various shades along the Israeli political spectrum, and viewed Labor and Likud as merely two sides ofthe same coin and two faces ofthe same existential challenge-the State of Israel-with which the Arabs have been struggling for an entire generation. Hafiz wrote: [O]ver the years, Israel has tried to delude world public opinion. However, this propaganda failed. One of the reasons for this failure was the rise to power of the Likud government at the end of the 1980s [sic. the 1970s] together with a series of small religious parties. This revealed in even greater clarity just what its real aim was; the intentions of the Zionist entity cannot be hidden behind expressions in favor of peace made by present Israeli leaders [i.e., Rabin and Peres]. (p...

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