The Norms of Answerability: Social Theory Between Bakhtin and Habermas

8. A DIALOGUE ON THE NATION IN POSTNATIONAL TIMES

8 A DIALOGUE ON THE NATION IN POSTNATIONAL TIMES Nations and nationalism are not going to disappear with globalization , nor are the conflicts they engender. If this is the case then we need to know more about what kind of nations and nationalism might be imagined dialogically and democratically in the context of an emerging “postnational constellation.” To explore this question this chapter employs a version of the methodology and social theory situated between Bakhtin and Habermas, which I have endeavored to outline in earlier chapters. My strategy is to isolate some fundamental oppositions between different theoretical positions on nations in the postnational era and from these positions, or “parts,” to consummate a “whole” in the form of a mutually supportive theory that could take into account the problem of two-sided answerability—even within the context of increasingly decentered societies. Thus, this chapter sets aside direct discussion of Bakhtin’s work and instead enacts his theories through a dialogue with a group of contemporary thinkers (including Habermas) who can be seen to mutually reinforce each other’s positions despite what appear to be irreconcilable differences. The dialogic way of imagining opposite positions that carry legitimate differences is easily seen in the argument that cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism are not incompatible and that they can in fact be held simultaneously (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995). By this I simply mean that there is no inherent contradiction in joining the ideal of the universal citizen with the particular identity of the city dweller. Echoing Bakhtin’s two-sided normative approach to answerability , Kai Nielsen argues that in moral philosophy it is crucial to “see 167 the universal in certain particulars, so a cosmopolitan may be intensely partial to a particular nation or group while at the same time having committed to the whole of humanity. We must refuse to put the interests of our country before wider human interests. Still this does allow us, and arguably requires us in certain circumstances to support liberal nationalism” (1999, 8). To be sure there are many historical reasons to be wary of nationalism . On the other hand, condemning all forms of nationalism as inherently xenophobic is a serious empirical and theoretical mistake—as is the assertion that “nationalist conflicts are in principle, by their very nature, irresolvable,” to again cite Brubaker’s provocative position. More moderate positions argue that the question of liberal nationalism needs to be addressed through constitutional reforms in the context of the politics or struggles over recognition. Charles Taylor (1994) galvanized this position in his argument for a balance between a procedural model for individual rights (Liberalism I) and a second-level model that would guarantee collective rights for Aboriginal peoples and a French-speaking national minority in Canada (Liberalism II). Habermas joined the debate on recognition with a special reference to the Quebec question and a critical response to Taylor’s two-level formulation of liberalism (Habermas 1994). Will Kymlicka continues to provide one of the most dynamic additions to the debate on citizenship and multiculturalism and has made important contributions to the debate over Quebec (1995; 1998). Although the Quebec case is cited in almost all comparative studies of contemporary nationalism, its own theoretical understanding of itself is not well known or understood given the linguistic divide in North America wherein Frenchspeaking Quebec intellectuals are rarely heard from.1 Introducing two of Quebec’s best-known social theorists, the late Marcel Rioux (1919–1992) and Fernand Dumont (1927–1996), whose ideas contradict and complement positions taken up by Habermas, Taylor, and Kymlicka, is one way of balancing the scales.2 They differ from these latter thinkers in the sense that while neither pursues an extreme primordial definition of the nation, each theorizes ethnos over demos when defining the nation as a sociology of culture. Thinking dialogically about the counterpoint between the legitimate differences on both sides of the national question in postnational times leads me to push the approach to recognition farther than its original authors would perhaps want. Intellectuals caught within the tension of an immanent critique of constraints imposed by surrounding postcolonial structures, and the affirmation of their own interior 168 The Norms of Answerability discourse—in itself often divided between the voices of utopia and those of pragmatism—find themselves in a spiraling counterpoint. Unraveling this counterpoint is a key to the comprehension of its dialogical form. As was seen in earlier chapters, dialogue...