The Elections in Israel 1999

9. Barak, One—One Israel, Zero, Or, How Labor Won the Prime Ministerial Race and Lost the Knesset Elections

9 Barak, One—One Israel, Zero, Or, How Labor Won the Prime Ministerial Race and Lost the Knesset Elections Gideon Doron Introduction Ehud Barak’s three-year political drive against the incumbent, Benjamin Netanyahu, was successfully translated into victory in the May 1999 election. Labor on the other hand, the party he chaired since 1997 (and that ran under the banner of One Israel), was not as successful. It lost close to 30 percent of its power, obtaining only 26 seats in the Fifteenth Knesset—the lowest number of representatives ever. Postelection, while still the largest party and the pivot in Barak’s ruling coalition, Labor provided its leader with neither a firm parliamentary base for legislation nor the flexibility needed for governance. Barak’s electoral success may be attributed to three not mutually exclusive factors. The first is his long-term and highly effective campaign strategy. The second is the effects of the 1992 electoral reform that allows voters to differentiate between preferences for the prime minister and for the Knesset. The third is the subperformance of the incumbent both on the substantive policy level and the management of his campaign. Given the built-in theoretical and practical advantages of the incumbent (Doron and Harris 2000), Netanyahu’s mismanagement helped Barak win the election. Labor lost because, like Likud in 1996, its leaders adopted the thesis that executive ruling and parliamentary representation are two values that need not, because they can not, simultaneously be maximized. Hence, when forced to choose, they opt for the proposition that it is more important to maximize the winning-chances of its leader than to secure its traditional parliamentary base. To obtain this Likud paid, in 1996, 14 of its potential Knesset seats to both Gesher and Tzomet. Its poor performance in 1999, 179 when it obtained only 19 Knesset seats, is partial result of that trade-off. Labor too, by altering its name to One Israel (Yisrael Achat), thus providing its leader with more spatial flexibility, allocated safe slots on its Knesset list to members of Gesher and Meimad. Its failure to sustain its size in the Knesset however can be attributed to other factors; most importantly, an almost complete emphasis—in terms of energy, attention, and resources— on Barak’s personal campaign. The main argument presented here is that given the specific design of the new electoral rules that do not permit a candidate to compete independently of his party, the opportunity costs of Barak’s 1999 victory are directly related to Labor’s electoral loses. Consequently, the intentions of the reformers—to strengthen the governance capabilities of the prime minister—backfired. Without a large and loyal party to back his policy programs, even routine decisions such as the approval of the annual national budget risk governance stability. The first part of this chapter concentrates on the strategy used in Barak’s campaign. Special attention is given to the “politics of amotot,” ad hoc civil associations founded to bypass legal and other limitations imposed on the activities of candidates and parties. The second part analyzes the electoral outcomes of both Barak and Labor. The third provides an assessment of the governance capability and glomming prospects of Barak’s coalition. Barak vs. the Labor Party Barak’s quest for the post of prime minister began upon his 1995 retirement from the army. Many observers of his impressive military career anticipated this decision (Kaspit and Kfir 1998). Upon the request of Yitzhak Rabin, the five-time decorated retired Israel Defense Forces chief of staff assumed the post of minister of interior. Following Rabin’s assassination in November 1995, he was appointed foreign minister under Shimon Peres. While learning the ropes of politics and the art of diplomacy, he projected the image of the most right-wing minister among his Labor colleagues. In the government, he refused to support steps to implement the Oslo Peace Agreement with the Palestinians, or to explicitly recognize their right to an independent state (Shitrit 1998). During the 1996 election Barak was in charge of the incumbent ’s personal headquarters. Following Peres’s defeat, however, public blame for the loss was directed toward Haim Ramon who was responsible for the campaign, and toward the candidate himself (Kasbit, Kristal, and Kfir 1996). Barak succeeded in avoiding the public reputation of a “loser” that was associated with Peres and Ramon. This led senior members of Rabin’s camp within Labor to select Barak as their leader. While considered...