The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity

NOTES

NOTES Introduction 1. There were of course some exceptions. The most important one was the developmental account of A. Kenny (1972), which was a pioneer in emphasizing points of continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought. 2. Important steps in this direction were already taken in the 1980s by commentators who have reconstructed interesting lines of continuity in the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought: Baker and Hacker (1985); Hintikka and Hintikka (1986); and D. Pears (1987 and 1988). More recently, there have been careful examinations of the previously overlooked intermediate period of Wittgenstein’s philosophy which stress the continuity of his thought. See D. Stern (1995) and D. Jacquette (1998). 3. Later writings such as On Certainty (from 1950–51) will remain beyond the scope of this work. I will assume that there are no substantive changes in Wittgenstein’s view after he completed the composition of the rule-following discussion in part 1 of the Philosophical Investigations by 1945. Since no one in the literature argues that there are such changes, the attempt to show the continuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy after 1945 seems superfluous. Therefore, the goal of this book will be simply to show the unity in the development of Wittgenstein’s thought from the Tractatus to the Investigations. An examination of the rule-following discussion will bring my developmental account to a conclusion. 4. In my opinion the newly formed orthodoxy in the Wittgenstein literature sometimes goes too far in denying any new development or change in Wittgenstein’s thought throughout his career. Although I reject this extreme formulation of the continuity thesis, I take my developmental 195 196 Notes to Chapter 1 account to be in line with and give support to the recent trend in the literature . As Alice Crary puts it in her introduction to The New Wittgenstein, what is characteristic of the new line of interpretation that originates in Diamond’s and Conant’s work is not the idea that Wittgenstein never changed his mind but, rather, the idea that Wittgenstein’s philosophy “is unified in its fundamental aim, in its characteristic modes of criticism and even, to some degree, in its methods” (Crary and Read [2000], p. 13). However, I do not want to overstate the general convergence between my developmental account and the recent trend in the literature. For my interpretation of Wittgenstein will also be critical of certain aspects of this trend. See my critical remarks on Diamond (1991) in chapter 1 (section 1.1; though I do rely heavily on her work); my arguments in response to Minar (1995) in chapter 6 (section 6.4); and my arguments against Cerbone (2000) in notes 159, 200, and 204. 5. As we shall see, these different kinds of contextualism draw on different conceptions of the holistic aspects of language. 6. See M. Dummett, “Frege and Wittgenstein,” in I. Block (1981), pp. 31–42; and Baker (1988). 7. See Diamond (1991), esp. chapters 2–4, pp. 95–144; Conant (1991a); and Reck (2000). Chapter 1. Necessity and Intelligibility in the Tractus 1. Cf. A. Kenny (1972), chapter 6, pp. 103–119; E. B. Allaire, “Tractatus 6.3751,” in S. Shanker (1986) vol. 1, pp. 202–206; J. Austin, “Wittgenstein’s Solutions to the Color Exclusion Problem,” also in S. Shanker (1986) vol. 1, pp. 207–12; and S. Shanker (1987), p. 6. 2. See esp. D. Jacquette (1990). 3. Diamond (1991), p. 195. 4. Wittgenstein makes this remark about the truth of a tautology when he writes: “It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they are true from the symbol alone” (6.113). He could have said the same thing about the falsity of a contradiction. 5. Diamond (1991), p. 196. 6. For a fuller account of what I have termed “the deontologization of necessity,” I refer the reader to her exposition in “Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the Tractatus,” in Diamond (1991), pp. 179–204. 7. Diamond (1991), p. 193. 8. In the normal case of a significant proposition, its logical form shows which possibility is depicted by the proposition. By contrast, the logical form of tautologies and contradictions shows that there is no possi- Notes to Chapter 1 197 bility whatsoever that they depict. “Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing” (4.461). 9. Diamond gives an account of why Wittgenstein’s remark that there...