Between Reason and History: Habermas and the Idea of Progress

Chapter 3. The Developmental Theory of Social Evolution

Chapter 3 The Developmental Theory of Social Evolution
A s I have shown in the previous chapter, the theory of social evolution plays a complementary role to the formal-pragmatic analysis of language use in Habermas’s conception of critical theory. It complements the formalpragmatic aspect by providing an explanation of the historical, or diachronic, development of structures of consciousness. It postulates universal logics of development for these structures, which delimit the horizon of possible determinate historical forms. Thus, we can identify the rational structures underlying any given society, while at the same time explaining the possibility of value and cultural pluralism. It is my objective in the present chapter to systematically explicate and clarify Habermas’s theory of social evolution.1 Before we can critically examine its fruitfulness as a research program, we first need to clarify the basic concepts and logical structure of the theory itself—only when we are in possession of a theory that is sufficiently specific and hence capable of falsification can we proceed to judge its theoretical merits. General Considerations Habermas assembled the central elements of the theory of social evolution primarily during the 1970s when he was codirector with C. F. von Weizsäcker of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of the Conditions of Life in the ScientificTechnical World.2 There he was able to draw upon substantial interdisciplinary research out of which the theory of social evolution is derived, and which the theory is intended to explain. He developed it in a series of early essays proposing a reconstruction of historical materialism, but he never systematized the theory as a whole.3 Unfortunately, Habermas has not returned to the topic of social evolution since these early programmatic essays. In each of the collections of critical essays concerning Habermas’s work that include replies by Habermas, when issues regarding the theory of social evolution arise, Habermas declines to take up and expand upon this topic.4 He indicates, however, that he declines not because he has 73 had second thoughts, but because of the difficulty and complexity of the issues involved . In each case he defers specifically to the complexity and difficulty of the task.5 It is my intention here to contribute to the clarification and systematization of this important and necessary element of Habermas’s critical social theory. Conceptual and Theoretical Distinctions An adequate understanding of any theory requires a proper understanding of its constitutive concepts and terms.This is especially important regarding a theory of social evolution because of the general disagreement and lack of clarity concerning the basic concepts of social evolution, development, and progress. I will attempt in this section to clarify the definitions of, and distinctions between, the central concepts that characterize Habermas’s theory of social evolution. In a 1946 report on the theory and practice of historiography to the Social Science Research Council, Charles Beard and Sydney Hook explicitly attempted to clarify various historical concepts.6 In this report, Hook (who was primarily responsible for the section containing the definitions) defines change as “any difference in position, form, quality,” where difference is determined relative to some criterion.7 Hence, historical change refers to “differences in the behavior of human beings as members of a social group or differences in the behavior and organization of things and institutions which condition changes in human behavior.”8 This definition of historical change, however, is limited to a third-person observer’s perspective , and thus it does not account for fundamental changes in the structures of consciousness of the historical agents. It would be useful, then, to expand Beard and Hook’s definition of social change to include (1) the qualitative changes in the behavior of social agents as members of a group, or (2) changes in the organization of social structures that condition social action, or (3) changes in fundamental attitudes or orientations of social agents with respect to their environments. This sense of social change does not imply any notion of directionality, or value judgment ; it is strictly a descriptive term. The concept of social evolution also has various senses, the ambiguity arising in part from the origins of the concept. Tom Bottomore asserts that “[t]he notion of social evolution was taken directly from the theories of biological evolution . . . .”9 But Robert Nisbet argues that “it is one of the more curious misconceptions of much modern writing in the history of social thought that nineteenth-century social evolutionism was simply an adaptation of the...