Between Reason and History: Habermas and the Idea of Progress

Chapter 4. The Idea of a Developmental Logic of History

Chapter 4 The Idea of a Developmental Logic of History
I n the previous chapter I analyzed and clarified the main elements of the theory of social evolution. The aim there was to provide a clear and coherent account of the theory as a whole. In this chapter, I will analyze and assess the core concept of the theory of social evolution: the idea of a developmental logic of social change. The concept of developmental logic plays a central role in Habermas’s theory of social evolution by explaining the rationalization of structures of consciousness, especially normative structures of consciousness, in the evolutionary development of societies. Moreover, the concept of developmental logic provides the critical theorist with the normative grounds to analyze the processes of social change that have given rise to contemporary social structures, and this sociohistorical analysis of the present is intended to specify the deep structures that determine particular social formations. It is thus able to locate the rationality potentials that are latent within given societies, and it locates those developments that can be considered deformed in the sense that they are irrational. An adequate understanding of Habermas’s theory of social evolution, therefore, requires a clear account of what is meant by the idea of a developmental logic of normative structures, and of the function this concept of developmental logic plays within the general theory. There have been three general reactions to Habermas’s developmental theory of social evolution.The first type of reaction arose in the period between the publication of Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), and TheTheory of Communicative Action (1984, 1987). In commenting on Habermas’s conception of critical theory, which at that time was presented as a reconstruction of historical materialism, these commentators often addressed directly some of the apparent problems in Habermas’s sketch of the theory of social evolution.1 These commentators typically acknowledged the central role played by the theory of social evolution in Habermas’s critical theory. This is not surprising given the fact that during this period, Habermas’s attempts to clarify the normative foundations of critical 105 theory remained explicitly within the framework and categories of historical materialism . The second and third types of reaction arose after the publication of The Theory of Communicative Action. On the one hand, some commentators simply reduced Habermas’s critical theory to the theory of communicative action itself, or to the theory of discourse ethics based on this theory.2 This, to be sure, was motivated in part by Habermas’s presentation in The Theory of Communicative Action, which placed the theory of social evolution in the background, while developing the formal pragmatics of language-use and restricting diachronic considerations to a theory of modernity. These commentators effectively ignored the diachronic dimension of his critical social theory by focusing exclusively on the theories of communicative action and discourse ethics. A third set of reactions recognize the centrality of the theory of social evolution to Habermas’s conception of critical theory , but for various reasons do not pursue an assessment of the theory itself. Some, such as Stephen White, maintain that the theory of social evolution is simply too sketchy at this stage to admit of adequate assessment, while others consider it only superficially and consequently dismiss it as prima facie implausible.3 Yet others do acknowledge, whether explicitly or implicitly, the significance of the theory of social evolution in Habermas’s system, but they present only partial critiques of limited aspects of it.4 Despite these often insightful critiques, relatively little attention has been paid exclusively to the theory itself. While the criticism that the theory of social evolution is too underdeveloped to be properly assessed is valid—hence this study—only Michael Schmid has attempted to clarify and systematize it. The general consequence of these reactions, in conjunction with the fact that Habermas has since focused on other topics, is that the current debates concerning Habermas’s work almost completely ignore the role of the theory of social evolution by focusing on the formal pragmatics of language use, or on the theory of discourse ethics. Moreover, the trajectory of Habermas’s interests in the last decade and a half, in the direction of moral and political theory, has solidified the view that Habermas has effectively abandoned the theory of social evolution.This view, however, is quite mistaken. Although in The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas was not interested in developing further the theory of social evolution, he...