Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion: From Philosophy of God to Philosophy of Religious Studies

Chapter One The Kehre of Philosophy of God, and Theology

9 Chapter One The Kehre of Philosophy of God, and Theology Like every good philosopher Lonergan never tires of exploiting the meaning of terms for his own purposes, to be his “little self ” as he once remarked (PRP:126). The term “philosophy of religion” is no exception. If introductory textbooks on the subject are any indication of what philosophy of religion is, then Lonergan’s meaning differs substantially. The fact that his initial etchings of it are traced in a short paper that looks to social ethicist Gibson Winter for inspiration is illustrative of this (2C:189–92). In other words, one is not going to find arguments for God’s existence or solutions to the “problem ” of evil in Lonergan’s philosophy of religion, technically so-called. Complicating matters somewhat is the fact that Lonergan does offer his own peculiar answer to such questions endemic to philosophy of religion, but under the guise of “philosophy of God,” sometimes called “natural” or “philosophical theology.” Bracketing the larger issue whether Lonergan’s philosophy of God is accurately understood as philosophy of religion in the generic sense, we simply note for the time being that his philosophy of God is not his philosophy of religion. His philosophy of religion seeks to provide a critical ground for the relation of religious studies and theology, both functions of which he treats positively. His philosophy of God, on the other hand, particularly in its late stage, seeks to resituate or reclaim for theology (i.e., systematics ) the activity of philosophizing about God. Much more will be said about these different types of philosophizing. Here this particular distinction is mentioned as a basic characteristic of their diverse functioning. It is also a convenient means of indicating the general framework within which Lonergan’s philosophizing takes place. 10 THE KEHRE OF PHILOSOPHY OF GOD, AND THEOLOGY MAKING ROOM FOR RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE Prior to the 1980s, scholarly discussion of Lonergan’s philosophizing about God and religion is for the most part limited to his proof for the existence of God and his proposed solution to the problem of evil, although the former tends to dominate the discussion.1 Both aspects are detailed in the last two chapters of his philosophical masterwork Insight (1957). Around the mid1970s attention shifts from Lonergan’s proof for the existence of God to his theological method prompted by the publication of Method in Theology (1972). Except for scattered contributions on his post-Insight emphasis on religious experience, discussion of topics in Lonergan relevant to philosophers of religion begins to peter out. This doubtless owes itself to the fact that around this time Lonergan shifts his attention from his controversial argument for God’s existence to what he came to see as its basis, that is, religious experience or, more generally , the religious phenomenon thought through theologically and analyzed historically through various methods produced by the human sciences. Is it any wonder that the philosophical community accustomed to analyzing truth in propositional terms evidences little interest here? Assigning logic a less perennial role than it has received in the West contributed to Lonergan’s cultivation of extra-logical concerns, which some philosophers of religion think legitimate, yet merely assume or ignore in their candid admissions about the limits of logic. It is tempting to think of Lonergan’s mid-1970s shift as representing a radical break in his thinking. To push the issue of logic further, one might make the case that Lonergan freed himself from the alluring benefits of logic, which is so integral to his early work especially.2 For instance, in his St. Michael’s Lectures on Philosophy of God, and Theology (1973), Lonergan complains about the treatment of God’s existence and attributes in Insight—no doubt prodded by the steady stream of criticisms that followed its publication. He notes disapprovingly that God’s existence and attributes are treated there “in a purely objective fashion” predicated by an acceptance of intrinsically necessary first principles and a monist view of culture, that there is only one right culture (PGT:13). On this basis alone, it is difficult to avoid drawing the conclusion that Lonergan abandoned the rather bloodless categories that adorn his early Latin treatises, vestiges of which may be seen in that notorious chapter on God in Insight, chapter 19. Add to this that following Philosophy of God, and Theology Lonergan stops writing and lecturing about God’s existence altogether as the conclusion to an argument. What he...