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Chapter 7 STRADDLING THE MILLENNIUM
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Chapter 7 STRADDLING THE MILLENNIUM I. The Center That Could Not Hold Netanyahu’s narrow victory did not remedy the Likud’s basic malady, but it did ensure a remission. From dwelling chiefly on the peace process, the top leaders, now ministers, had to extend their concerns. Frictions within the party itself had been reduced as most of its prominent members moderated their tone. This in part was due to the tendency of those benefiting from government positions to be sensitive to the pragmatic aspect of governing on which their positions depended , and hence their relative restraint.1 But another moderating factor related to the peace process itself. The first problem was the fulfillment of the previous government’s commitment to a withdrawal in Hebron. This was a bitter pill to swallow, but firm international obligations could hardly be nullified by an Israeli government. Most Likud leaders acceded to the inevitable and even to the likelihood that some additional concessions would have to be made in the course of time. The substitution of a relative “more or less” for the absolute “yes or no” in itself contributed to moderation. Nevertheless, from the very beginning storm clouds began to accumulate. They darkened throughout 1997 until, late in the year and more intensively in 1998, they broke out in periodic storms. The situation that developed lends itself to a more apt metaphor: the prime minister as a juggler challenged by more and more balls that threaten his timing. One reason for the success of the 1996 Likud campaign was that it turned back the peace issue from a debate between Israel and the Palestinians to one between itself and Labor. Whether the Palestinians would accept peace at the reduced price the Likud offered to Israel was a problem that was never raised. The insistence of the new government to renegotiate the terms of the Hebron withdrawal only deepened Palestinian suspicions and led to bitter bargaining that lasted until the beginning of 1997. But the acridity expressed itself also in clashes, the most serious of which occurred toward the end of September 1996, when a tunnel along the outer wall of the Temple area was opened. The disturbances throughout the West Bank were the worst since the pre-Oslo era, whereas 186 the urgent Arafat-Netanyahu summit Clinton convened inaugurated a new phase in which the United States began to intervene actively, exchanging the impartial role of an honest broker and facilitator for that of a direct participant, thereby limiting the maneuverability of the government. The ultraright too organized to pressure the government to adopt firm stands. What prodded this was not only the frustration brought about by the Hebron deal, but also the realization that it signaled the continuation of the peace process. Notwithstanding the Likud’s repudiation of the gradualist logic underlying Oslo, once in power the Likud-led government found itself obliged to undertake three additional withdrawals as steps toward the final status negotiations. Unlike Hebron, the extent of these was left open, and the onus fell on the government to hammer it out with the Palestinians. In the atmosphere of mutual suspicion, the offer to fulfill the first phase by transferring to exclusive Palestinian rule 2 percent of the territory already under joint control was immediately rejected. This meant haggling over the second phase under even deeper suspicions, with the Americans this time fully involved. Readiness to negotiate under such conditions was interpreted by settlers, who almost unanimously had supported Netanyahu in the elections, as reneging on his commitments. More ominously, the sense of betrayal was shared by MKs of coalition parties, including several of the Likud itself . One expression of the malaise was the reawakening after a hibernation of several years of the veteran parliamentary Land of Israel Front. A nebulous forum chaired by a Likud (Gesher) MK, it contained approximately 17 members (the exact number varied), two of whom were from the opposition Moledet party but the rest from the parties in the coalition: the NRP, Israel Ba’aliya, and, the largest number, from the Likud. Their demand for the reduction to a minimum of the territories to be conceded was justified by Palestinian breaches of their duties under the Oslo agreement, and these should be countered by insisting on full compliance in return for any further step in the negotiations. Otherwise they threatened to bring down the government, a warning reinforced by the fact that some of the hawkish Likud...