Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself

6. Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty: Some of Their Contributions and Limitations for “Environmentalism”

CHAPTER 6 Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty Some of Their Contributions and Limitations for “Environmentalism” MONIKA LANGER Phenomenology broadly conceived has much to offer “environmentalism .” At the same time, environmentalism implicitly highlights some shortcomings of phenomenology. Without attempting to be comprehensive , this chapter will offer reflections on three classic phenomenologists: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Before outlining some of their potential (or actual) contributions and shortcomings, it is necessary to indicate the main features of environmentalism. “Environmentalism” is a popular term for an inherently very diverse and fluid series of sociopolitical movements characterized by their concern for the “environment” and their willingness to take measures to address “environmental problems.” Environmentalism may be reformist or more radical. The former is anthropocentric and aims to ameliorate the environment primarily for the benefit of “anthropos” (“man”). To this end, “reform environmentalists” employ such measures as “resource management” (including “resource conservation”) or technological innovations , but see no need for a fundamental change in perspective or values. A more radical environmentalism is ecocentric and seeks to improve the life of planet Earth as a whole. Its adherents believe that “nature” is sentient and intrinsically valuable. They regard environmental problems as the result of an androcentric, consumerist lifestyle, which 103 they reject. Instead, they seek to establish a way of living that is in harmony with, and enhances, all forms of life. Responsive to the needs of nonhuman beings, they may work to restore habitats and native species, to support community gardens and organic growers, to stop genetic engineering and animal experimentation, to halt clear-cut logging, and to eliminate various sources of pollution. To counter consumerism, they practice some form of voluntary simplicity. They also attempt to integrate theory, experience, and practice. Among these more radical environmentalists there are those who realize that the dominant, destructive lifestyle is bound up with a profoundly flawed, dualistic ontology. Further, “eco-feminists” recognize that the traditional subjugation of women is connected with the domination of “nature,” and that both spring from the same dualistic and hierarchical ontology. Radical environmentalists emphasize the need for a thorough, ongoing, transdisciplinary questioning of ourselves and of our culture’s dominant worldview. Rejecting the fact/value split, many of them (“deep ecologists”) stress the inextricable intertwining of all life forms and seek “self-realization” in the widest and deepest identification with “nature.” By contrast, eco-feminists tend to caution against such identification. They emphasize respect and care for nature understood as a community of related but distinct beings.1 Various radical environmentalists have argued that the notion of nature is itself fraught with difficulty, as are notions of environment (and thus “environmentalism”) and environmental problems. The debates concerning these notions—most particularly the notion of nature—are very complex, extensive, and far reaching. Since they exceed the scope of this chapter, only a few of their features can be indicated here. Debates about nature raise a plethora of questions such as the following: Does nature mean either “wilderness” or “wildness”? If nature is synonymous with one of these terms, does this not reinforce a dualistic ontology (which divides humans from nature)? Are humans identifiable with “nature” understood holistically? If so, can any conceivable human action be considered “unnatural”? By the same token, is it possible to distinguish between nature and culture? Is nature a human construct? Are notions of nature connected with notions of gender in human societies? Is it possible to find a nature unaffected by processes of social construction? Can humans derive ethical principles from a notion of nature? Can humans speak as, or for, nature? Can language speak “the truth” of nature? Is it possible to develop an environmental philosophy that does not colonize nature, if nature is conceived as fundamentally irreducible to human representations ? Do notions of holism, interconnectedness, and integration with nature invariably erase the alterity of nature? 104 Langer Debates about nature occasionally make use of metaphors such as Mother Nature, Mother Earth, virgin forests, rape of the land, and rape of nature. As eco-feminist Tzeporah Berman points out, these metaphors portray the male bias in environmental discourse and perpetuate hegemonic traditions. Berman therefore calls for the creation of “a positive semantic space” and nonpatriarchal tropes for nature.2 Similarly, Catriona Sandilands cautions that the representation of nature as female or as “home” obscures the fundamental strangeness of nature and facilitates its authoritarian colonization. Sandilands urges eco-feminists to undertake a discursive construction of...