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Appendix 3 Aristotle on k§rion Predication In S.E. 4 there appears a short enumeration of the causes of fallacies of double meaning. There are three ways of [arguing falsely] due to homonymy and amphiboly. [1] One is when either the phrase or the name standardly (kur√wV) signifies more than one thing, e.g., a÷t¬V and k§wn. [2] One is when we are accustomed to speak in this way. [3] Third is when the combination [of words] signifies more than one thing, although in separation each signifies singly, for example, the combination “knowing letters” (÷p√statai grºmmata). For each word, both “knowing” and “letters,” should it so happen, signifies one thing; but both [together] signify more than one, either the letters themselves have knowledge or another has knowledge of letters. So amphiboly and homonymy occur in these ways.1 To understand this short passage, it is necessary to briefly discuss Aristotle’s doctrine of “standard” or k§rion predication. Many of the fallacious arguments due to language hinge upon the predication of names either “standardly” (kur√wV) or “nonstandardly.” It is difficult to render kur√wV in English. Most translators render it in these contexts by “strictly” or “properly.” I have chosen “standardly” (and the adjective “standard” for k§rion) rather than “properly” to avoid confusing Aristotle’s k§rion ∫noma with the English “proper name” in either its grammatical sense (where it contrasts with “common noun”) or the various philosophical senses arising out of Russell’s theory of descriptions (where grammatical proper names and definite descriptions are contrasted to logically proper names). The difficulty of finding an English equivalent is due to the fact that Aristotle is attempting in his doctrine of kur√on predication to respond to a debate between two extreme views of language. These two views are critically investigated in Plato’s dialogue Cratylus. One view, the naturalist position , is defended by Cratylus. Names, according to this theory, are iconic. They 179 imitate and make clear the essence of the thing named.2 Because things have unique natures, there can be, by this theory, one and only one correct name for each thing “the same for all, both Greeks and barbarians.”3 In the dialogue, after developing the naturalist position, Socrates contrasts it to an alternative: the theory that Hermogenes and many others claim, that names are conventional and represent things to those who established the convention and knew the things beforehand, and that convention is the sole principle of correctness in names, and it makes no difference whether we accept the existing convention or adopt an opposite one according to which small would be called “great” and great “small.”4 The disagreements between the naturalists and the conventionalists comprise a well-documented and long-standing dispute within the ancient world.5 In the Cratylus, the spokesmen for the two positions—Hermogenes, the conventionalist, and Cratylus, the naturalist—appeal to Socrates for adjudication on the issue of the correctness of names. In typical fashion, Socrates first argues against Hermogenes in favor of a view of language naturally mirroring reality. But then he engages Cratylus to show the weaknesses of the naturalist position and the need for the role of convention in establishing correct names. Where these two Socratic critiques finally leave Plato is a matter of some debate.6 What is clear is that Plato enlists his standard doctrine that the proper objects of knowledge are the extralinguistic Forms in order to defeat the extreme naturalism of Cratylus, for if names accurately make clear the essences (i.e., Forms) of things, then words themselves become legitimate objects of philosophic study. Etymology becomes a road to knowledge . Socrates’ attack upon the naturalist position effectively defeats the belief that the study of names brings the sort of wisdom sought by the true philosopher . On the other hand, once Socrates has dethroned names from being the objects of study to being tools for studying the real objects, he acknowledges that, like all tools, some are better than others at their designated function.7 So some names are better than others, and Socrates is forced back to the criterion of imitation for evaluating the relative utility of names. The dialogue ends with Socrates insisting that one must know the Forms apart from their names in order to properly judge the accuracy and correctness of those names. The dialogue is aporetic, in that it leaves Socrates caught...

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