Aristotle on False Reasoning: Language and the World in the Sophistical Refutations

Appendix 2

Appendix 1 177 Appendix 2 Words and Counters—Platonic Antecedents Aristotle’s comparison (S.E. 1, 165a6–17) of the use of words in dialectic to the use of counters in arithmetic, and his concern with the vulnerability of the inexperienced (†peiroi) in both activities, is a reworking of a similar worry voiced by Adeimantus in Republic VI. There Socrates is arguing for the need for philosopher-rulers. He has just produced a long list of virtues that are agreed to characterize the philosophic nature. The climax of the argument is that precisely such philosophic virtues happen also to be the most desirable traits in a political ruler. Adeimantus sees the force of the argument but remains bothered by the apparent fact that the actual men who have devoted themselves to philosophy are either completely strange and unlike (™ll¬kotoi) Socrates’ picture of the philosopher and totally depraved (pamp¬nhroi), or, if not morally deficient, they are totally useless to the city because of their philosophic pastimes. In short, the conclusion of Socrates’ argument runs contrary to actual Athenian experience with philosophers. And so Adeimantus voices this concern: Socrates, no one can dispute with you about these things. However, those who listen to you, every time they hear what you are now saying, they experience something like this; they think that because of their inexperience in the asking and answering of questions, they are being led astray by the speech, a little bit with each question, and when these little bits are gathered together at the end of the whole argument, a great fallacy appears, even a contradiction to what was said in the beginning. And just as those who are not well-practiced at checkers are held in check by those who are skillful, and they do not know what move to make, so also these who in the end are held in check, they too do not know what they should say, again because of this different kind of checkers game, one played not with counters but with words. When this happens, they do not believe that they hold the truth any better because of that experience. And I am speaking with an eye to the present case. For someone might now 177 say that although by argument he does not know how to oppose you in each question, yet in matter of fact he sees that however many rush to pursue philosophy, and not those who, having engaged in it as young men so as to be educated, rid themselves of it, but those who dwelt upon it for a very long time, most of them are becoming altogether strange, not to say totally depraved, while the others who seem the most reasonable nevertheless suffer this from their pursuit of this thing which you praise: they are becoming useless to their cities.1 There follows Socrates’ famous image of the ship of state with her trained pilot being ignored by the rest of the rowdy crew members. Although Aristotle has altered the second term of the analogy, from the counters used in a checkers game to counters used in arithmetical calculations,2 the concern is the same: the failure to be convinced by an argument coupled with the inability to refute the argument.3 Plato’s task in Republic VI is to remedy Adeimantus’ failure to be convinced by the argument; Aristotle’s task in S.E. is to remedy his students’ inability to refute sophistical arguments. Plato must explain why the facts adduced by Adeimantus only appear to conflict with the argument; Aristotle must explain why the argument only appears to conflict with an accepted fact. 178 APPENDIX 2 ...