Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude

3. Humanist and Mechanist Alternatives

C H A P T E R T H R E E Humanist and Mechanist Alternatives The dominance of humanism within philosophy since Descartes explains in great measure the incredulity with which panpsychism is usually greeted. Humanism seems to rest on three related considerations . First, there is appeal to the uniqueness of the human linguistic capacity. On the basis of this uniqueness, it is argued that we must provide a very different description of human behavior from that we employ for other species of life. Secondly, appeal is made to our unique capacity for self-consciousness, our capacity to not only have experiences, as do lower animals, but to be aware that we are having them. And finally, it is claimed, often on the basis of the first two considerations , that members of the human species are endowed with the capacity to freely choose between alternative courses of action. This is contrasted with animal behavior that is determined by external stimuli and internal physiological mechanisms. This chapter first outlines the nature of the alternatives posed by humanism and naturalism , and then describes attempts to extend mechanist descriptions of animal behavior to human language use. Finally, I outline the basis for humanist claims for human uniqueness. Humanism and Naturalism Humanism can be understood in a variety of ways. Some of them are entirely innocent, and included within them are some that indeed deserve our highest praise: they were the means of freeing humanity 55 from the shackles of religious dogmatism. Not so innocent, however, is a form of humanism we can label as philosophical humanism, the view that there exist metaphysical differences between human beings and lower forms of life that create what in chapter 2 we found Whitehead calling the “bifurcation of nature.” Philosophical humanism is most explicitly stated in Descartes’ well known division between humans and other species. The grounds for this division were methodological. We humans are capable of formulating to ourselves the sentence “I think” on the basis of our awareness of our thoughts, sensations, and emotions; we cannot be mistaken about the truth of the proposition expressed by this sentence. On the basis of this, Descartes argued, we postulate a subject of thinking, that which we refer to as our “mind,” the referent of the pronoun “I,” which is distinguished from the body as the object of public observation. Our minds are the source of our freedom, our capacity to choose between alternatives through acts of will that cause our bodily movements. Our bodies, in contrast, are governed by the mechanical laws investigated by the natural sciences. The awareness we have of our own thoughts and sensations doesn’t extend to other animals. For us they are only observed bodies, out there in the natural world, and governed by the laws applying to all bodies. For them we have no basis for thinking that they have minds; hence we must conclude that they are totally lacking in the capacity for choice enjoyed by our species. There is some question whether Descartes was even willing to attribute sensations to lower animals. But even if he had been, these sensations would be regarded by him as mere effects of physical stimuli having no causal powers themselves. Thus, lower animals may experience sensations, but their bodies are machines determining their behavior. With the distinction between what is free and what is determined comes also a distinction with regard to immortality. Although our bodies may perish on death, our minds survive, and immortality is insured for us; no such happy fate awaits the creatures with which we share our planet. Most contemporary humanists refuse to accept the gift of immortality offered by Descartes, and they reject his substance conception of minds. They do insist, however, on a division that preserves the uniqueness of human freedom. A version of this humanist view of human uniqueness has been recently formulated by John McDowell in terms of a contrast between behavior caused by “biological imperatives” and actions that are freely chosen. 56 Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude In mere animals, sentience is in the service of a mode of life that is structured exclusively by immediate biological imperatives. . . . We can recognize that a merely animal life is shaped by goals whose control of the animal’s behavior at a given moment is an immediate outcome of biological forces. A mere animal does not weigh reasons and decide what to do. . . . When...