About Psychology: Essays at the Crossroads of History, Theory, and Philosophy

3. The Moral Dimension of Psychological Practice, Theory, and Subject Matter

35 Chapter Three The Moral Dimension of Psychological Practice, Theory, and Subject Matter Charles W . Tolman NOT LONG AGO it was commonly held that the subject matter of psychology and its scientific study were morally neutral, an understanding expressed in the phrase “value-free science.” We have come a long way in the last half century, and few will be found among us today who defend this view. But fewer still, it appears, are willing to embrace the consequences of moral engagement, let alone attempt to spell out just how theory and practice in our discipline are moral, that is, not value-free. No introductory textbook that I know of—if such books can be taken as the wind vanes of the discipline—invites its readers to take seriously the notion that psychology may be a necessarily moral science. What I propose here is this: psychology is unavoidably a moral science in every respect, and that to ignore this fact results in a great disservice to the discipline, to all of those who serve it, and to those who are served by it. I shall begin with what is relatively easy to show, namely, that our professional practice is necessarily governed by moral considerations. But though agreement on this claim is at first easy to attain, it will be evident that the 36 About Psychology claim is not at all straightforward. Those who agree may understand what they are agreeing on differently. We will have to examine how this is so. Having done that, I shall proceed to show that our theories about the subject matter on which we practice are also subject to moral judgement. That is, a theory is not just examinable with respect to its truth, but it can also be assessed for moral rectitude. Nazi theories about race, for instance, were not just false, they were morally vicious. Finally, psychological practice and theory have moral involvements just because their subject matter is moral in nature. I will argue that morality is in fact just what makes us human and distinguishes us from other animals. Thus no human endeavor can be free of moral liability. PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE Recently, a colleague, whose opinion I had grown to trust, surprised me with the claim that psychologists, particularly those who work in the history of the discipline, seemed to him inappropriately preoccupied with moral judgement and seemed determined to use professional journals and conferences as launchpads for revolution. It appeared to me that the allegations were related: if practices or ideas current in psychology are judged to be morally vicious, then attempts to overthrow them in favor of more virtuous ones ought to be expected. Most would be disappointed if such corrective attempts were not made. The objections seemed to me particularly curious, given academe’s often well-advertised commitment to codes of ethical practice.The University of Victoria Faculty Handbook, for instance, contains an eight-page “Policy on Scholarly Integrity” that calls for intellectual honesty in all scholarly activities, whether in dealing with students or in research practice. With regard to the latter, it specifically lists examples of misconduct that all rightminded researchers abhor.These include plagiarism, falsification of research data, failure to give appropriate recognition to intellectual contributions made by colleagues, using others’ unpublished work without permission, and so on. Assuming that public pronouncements of this sort merely put in writing understandings that are commonly held in academe, I was puzzled by my colleague’s particular assertion that moral judgments were far more likely to topple otherwise laudable scholarship than they were to enhance it. What could possibly be laudable about scholarship that detaches itself from such moral judgements? Is it not precisely the observance of the moral standards of scholarship that makes the work laudable? The “Tenure Document” (TD) in the University of Victoria Faculty Handbook contains two pages on academic freedom and professional ethics. These are interesting because they go beyond the appearance of an externally imposed set of rules regarding professional conduct. The implied internal relation between freedom and duty is distinctly moral. Academic The Moral Dimension 37 freedom “involves the right of a faculty member, free from the threat of institutional reprisals and without regard to outside influence, to teach, investigate , publish, and speculate without deference to prescribed doctrine, to participate in the formulation of academic policies, and to criticize the University” (TD, 1.1.2). But this...