Friendship: Liberty, Equality, and Utility

2. The Structure of Friendship

Two The Structure of Friendship T H E N A T U R E O F F R I E N D S H I P THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS to questions about the moral justifiability of preferring friends to nonfriends and of any special friendship responsibilities must recognize that there are many different conceptions of friendship. In the preceding chapter, five distinct ideal conceptions of friendship were introduced , each of which may have its own explanation about justifications for preferring friends. Additional ideal conceptions of friendship are discussed later on to further illustrate different ways of understanding friendship. Conceptions of friendship other than ideal ones also exist. Both Aristotle and Kant discuss two less-than-ideal friendships: pleasure and utility friendships for Aristotle, and need friendships and friendships of taste for Kant. Each of these less-than-ideal friendships contains reasons for preferring friends to nonfriends . Little has been written about these less-than-ideal friendships, much of it misunderstanding and undervaluing them. Comprehending the similarities and differences of such a rich abundance of diverse friendship conceptions requires an adequate set of concepts. Three different aspects of friendship must be untangled and separated from each other: the basis of friendship, the object of friendship, and the nature of friendship. They must be distinguished if different conceptions of friendship 31 are to be adequately understood.1 Many confusions in recent discussions of friendship arise because these three distinct aspects are not well appreciated. The basis of friendship is the reason friends have for their relationship. Aristotle mentions three different bases: pleasure, utility, and virtue. Kant has his own three: need, taste, and sentiment. The object of friendship is what friends do together as constitutive of their friendship. It is within the object of friendship that moral issues of preferring friends to nonfriends primarily arise, because the object of friendship establishes how friends are expected to treat each other insofar as they are friends. The word “object” is better to use than either “goal” or “end,” because it lacks any instrumental connotation that sometimes is attached to the other two.2 Aristotle’s ideal friendship between friends of equal virtue has as its object a shared life of virtuous activity, while the object of Kant’s intimacy friendship is self-revelation and communion. Objects of friendship differ from its basis. The basis of friendship grounds friendship by providing a reason or justification for its object. A friendship might, for example, be based on pleasure and have as its object participation in amateur athletics. Pleasure would be the reason for friends participating together in athletics. Pleasure also can be a basis for friendships with intimacy as their object. Well-defined systematic differences exist between objects of several various conceptions of friendship . Before discussing the ways that conceptions of friendship differ from each other, I first must discuss the nature of the friendship relation, because it is in the nature of the relation that the greatest similarity exists among various friendship conceptions. The nature of friendship is a characterization of the relationship that distinguishes friendship from other relationships between people. Aristotle believes that a reciprocal goodwill is essential to friendship, and that it is found in friendships grounded on each of his three bases. A reciprocal goodwill between friends is common to friendships, whether they are based on “reasons” of pleasure, utility, or virtue: But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. . . . To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.3 To have a friendship, two persons must recognize that they each have goodwill for the other, that is, they do not merely feel kindly toward each other but try to promote the other’s good. Aristotle believes that pleasure, virtue, 3 2 F r i e n d s h i p and utility are distinct reasons for having a goodwill. As is seen later in this chapter, when Aristotle’s less-than-ideal friendships are discussed, a friendship based on utility is distinguished from commercial or business relationships, because utility friends have reciprocal goodwill, aiming for each other’s overall rather than partial good. Aristotle says that friends consider each other “another self,” so that one friend would care for the other as well as she would...