Friendship: Liberty, Equality, and Utility

Notes

Notes C H A P T E R O N E P R E F E R E N C E F O R F R I E N D S 1. I use the term nonfriend throughout to refer to persons who are not friends. For some reason, there is no single elegant English word to capture the idea that persons are not friends. The term stranger is not right, for people can know each other and still not be friends. Acquaintance is not right either, because it leaves out strangers. Sometimes I will use the term others to convey the same idea, that the persons are not friends. 2. See Michael Stocker, Plural and ConflictingValues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997). 3. See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 14, and his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 18. 4. Neera Kapur Badhwar, “Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship,” Ethics, 101:3 (April 1991): 499. 5. Troy A. Jollimore, Friendship and Agent-Relative Morality (New York: Garland, 2001), 9. 6. Again, I have in mind here Bernard Williams. But see Peter Railton, “Alienation , Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” in Consequentialism and its Critics , ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 95–96, and Adrian M. S. Piper, “Moral Theory and Moral Alienation,” Journal of Philosophy 84:2 (February 1987): 102–118. 7. W. D. Ross, The Right and The Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 28. 8. See John Hardwig,“In Search of an Ethics of Personal Relationships,” in Person to Person, ed. George Graham and Hugh LaFollette (Philadelphia: Temple University 169 Press, 1989), p. 17. Quoted in Marcia Baron, “Impartiality and Friendship,” Ethics 101:4 (July 1991): 846. 9. Legal obligations would be undertaken by the rule-constituted social institution of contracting. 10. This does not contradict the point made by Laurence Thomas, that friendships are minimally structured. See Laurence Thomas, “Friendship and Other Loves,” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 50. 11. The basis, object, and nature of friendship are fully explained in chapter 2. 12. Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle on the Shared Life,” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 91. She also cites John Cooper’s article,“Aristotle on Friendship,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 308. 13. Aristotle, CompleteWorks of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1156a3. 14. Aristotle, Complete Works, 1166a30 and 1159b25. 15. Ibid., 1171b29. 16. Sherman, “Aristotle,” 99. 17. Less-than-ideal friendships are more fully discussed in chapter 2. 18. More later about intimacy in Aristotle’s friendships. 19. Lara Denis,“From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63:1 (July 2001): 5–8. 20. See C. S. Lewis,“Friendship—The Least Necessary Love,” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 42. 21. As an example, see Ferdinand Schoeman, “Aristotle on the Good of Friendship ,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:3 (September 1985): 280. 22. David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 15. 23. From here on, I will use either the word “virtue” or “character” interchangeably to refer to what I have been calling Aristotle’s“ideal character” or“virtue friendship.” 24. Aristotle, Complete Works, 1160a1. 25. Ibid., 1172a18. 26. Ibid., 1177a21. 27. Cicero, “De Amicitia,” in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), p. 95. 28. Aristotle, Complete Works, 1159a8. 29. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 261. 30. Kant, Metaphysics, 261. 31. Ibid., 244. 32. Ibid., 244. 1 7 0 N o t e s t o C h a p t e r O n e 33. Ibid., 249. 34. Neera Badhwar Kapur [sic], “Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship,” Ethics 101:3 (April 1991): 499, and see Christine M. Korsgaard, “Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations,” in Philosophical Perspectives, 6...