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Index 249 aggravated local conflict, 6, 186, 198 Albright, Madeleine K., 8 Armenia: case profile, 72–74; coercive interventionist PD in, 145, 148, 150; conciliatory interventionist PD in, 125, 136, 161, 169–173 passim, 184, 191; conclusions, 197–205 passim; contributors to ethnic tension in, 89–97 passim; endgame in, 169, 170, 173, 184, 191; great power divisions over interventionist PD in, 53, 119; initial interventionist PD in, 99–103 passim; insulationist PD over, 108–115 passim, 182; Prevailing Opposition pattern and, 50–51; stillborn reform enforcement plan agreed to, 233n29, 236n12; transition developments in, 152, 153–154, 161, 164 arms control, force-dampening technique, 133–136 Belgium: case profile, 65–67; coercive interventionist PD in, 144, 145–146, 175–180 passim, 184, 186, 190; conciliatory interventionist PD in, 123, 124, 138, 161, 169–174 passim, 185, 187; conclusions, 197, 200, 205; contributors to ethnic tension in, 89–96 passim; divisions over interventionist PD quickly overcome, 116; endgame in, 169–190 passim; French vital interests in, 186; great power crisis management in, 226n10; great power division over interventionist PD in, 116; initial interventionist PD in, 99–103 passim, 116–117; great power cooperation most sustained over, 162; insulationist PD over, 108–113 passim, 181, 182, 183; Loose Concert pattern and, 48, 49, 50; transition developments in, 155, 157, 161, 162; unilateral French activity defined as incompatible with insulation, 66, 112 bipolarity, 52–56 Bismarck, Otto von, 109 Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia II): case profile , 80–83; coercive interventionist PD in, 145, 149–150, 162, 175–180 passim , 184, 188, 189, 191; conciliatory interventionist PD in, 123–139 passim, 161, 169–174 passim, 185, 186, 187; conclusions, 197–204 passim, 211, 212; contributors to ethnic tension in, 89–98 passim; early intervention based upon “common European home” theme, 59; early intervention poorly coordinated, 59; endgame in, 169–191 passim; great power crisis management of, 226n10; great power division over interventionist PD in, 117; initial interventionist PD in, 99–104 passim; insulationist PD over, 109, 113, 114–115, 182, 183; Loose Concert pattern and, 48–50; PD intervention requirements underestimated , 59; transition developments in, 152–164 passim Bosnian Revolution (Bosnia I): AustroHungarian vital interest in, 186; case profile, 69–72; coercive interventionist PD in, 148, 150, 151, 161, 175–180 passim, 184, 187–190 passim; conciliatory interventionist PD in, 123, 124, 125, 131, 132, 133, 138, 139, 164, 169–174 passim, 185, 187; conclusions , 197–209 passim; contributors to ethnic tension in, 89–98 passim; endgame in, 169–190 passim; great power crisis management in, 226n10; great power division over interventionist PD in, 117; initial interventionist PD in, 99–103 passim; insulationist PD over, 108–113 passim, 182, 183; Loose Concert pattern and, 48, 49, 50; transition developments in, 154–164 passim Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 3, 4, 60 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 4 Brown, Michael E., 26, 27, 28, 214n13, 216n31 case method. See focused case comparison method case selection, 18, 19, 62, 217n39 central conflict, for great powers: in Belgium and Bosnia I, 50 central regime, in ethnic conflict: 14, 89, 204; attitude toward interventionist PD, 10, 11, 136, 204, 224n25; outside support for, 203, 204 challenger group, in ethnic conflict, 92, 93, 95, 97, 125, 153, 202 civil war, the typical contemporary war type, 213n1 coercion, as interventionist PD: 146–147, 231n1; delayed or stymied by great power interests, 143, 145, 147–150, 161, 162, 163, 176, 179; effect on primary antagonists, 168, 175, 177, 178, 188; reflects inadequacy of conciliation, 175; stimulated by the great powers, 143, 160, 161, 175, 185; workability, 143–165, 175, 184, 187 collective great power PD: 8, 44; focus upon, justified, 6–7; impact compared to PD initiated unilaterally, 4, 7–8, 16, 24. See also great powers combination solution, for ethnic conflict, 103 “common European home,” 59, 110 concert, of great powers: durability of, 158, 164; major states need not all participate , 46; misperception of, by stronger primary antagonists, 187; weak and strong forms of, 183; unilateral great power intervention and, 158, 172, 199 conciliation, as interventionist PD: 169, 185, 186; effect of local conflict developments on, 138, 140, 149, 152, 160, 172; force-dampening and, 121, 126–141; gyroscopic, 164, 185, 200; impact on primary antagonists, 126, 138, 139, 141, 151; ineffectiveness of, 144, 160–161, 187; reconciliation efforts , 121–126, 138, 141; workability, 121–141, 150, 160, 168, 171, 173, 184 The Congo: case profile, 76–78; coercive interventionist PD over, 145, 148–149, 162, 175–180 passim, 184, 187–188, 189; conciliatory interventionist...

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